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Abstract
The US Navy expends millions of dollars annually on maintenance, repair, and overhaul
(MRO) procedures to maintain its jet fighter aircraft engine systems. As a result, the US Navy
has focused on methods to reduce the overall costs of maintenance for these systems. This thesis
will examine how an American engine manufacturer designs reliability, maintainability, and
sustainability (RM&S) into the ZM1O engine family and what the results of those design efforts
have meant to the users and maintainers of the system. This thesis focuses on the policies,
technologies, processes and tools, and practices used throughout the engine program to determine
whether or not sustainment issues were addressed in the engine programs. The data used were
the Unscheduled Engine Removal (UER) per 1000 Effective Flight Hours (EFH) and the
Scheduled Engine Removal (SER) per 1000 EFH to compare the sustainability of the different
models of the ZM10 engine family. Based on the data provided by the US Navy, I was unable to
make a definite conclusion that the derivative engine system was developed with more advanced
sustainment features to decrease the overall life-cycle costs for the ZM 10-2 engine system.
Thesis Supervisor: Professor Wesley L. Harris
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Chapter 1: Introduction
With the turn of the new millennium, many technological advances are sure to
follow. Advancements in designs, materials, processes, practices, tools, and technologies
have the opportunity to provide US military aircraft with greater capabilities. Exploring
these capabilities would require the Department of Defense (DoD) to spend more money
on research and development that it cannot afford. Faced with a flat budget over the last
ten years, it may be difficult for the DoD to take advantage of these new opportunities.
The US military has attempted to keep up with these new advances in technology.
One such way is through the increase of Procurement dollars in the federal budget to
allow the military to meet its goal of modernization (Figure 1.1). Modernization is
defined as the upgrading of existing systems. Each year the military strives to become
FIGURE 1.1: TOTAL DEFENSE BUDGET ALLOCATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR"2
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Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), "National Defense Budget Estimates for FY
2001," March 2000, pg. 6.
2 http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun20O1/b06272001 bt287-01.html
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more "modern", which is observed through its Procurement dollars. They also strive to
be even more "ready" to confront aggression. The operation & maintenance (O&M)
budget is the principal means by which military readiness is assured.
The US military spends almost twice as much on O&M then it does in procuring
new systems. The question is posed: Is it possible for the US military to be
technologically superior over potential enemies if they continue to spend more money on
operating and supporting systems instead of procuring new systems? Former Under
Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, and Technology, Jacques S. Gansler believes the US
military cannot if such a behavior continues.
Gansler stated in his letter to the DoD that "The past pattern of deferring
modernization; retaining and supporting obsolete systems and the facilities to support
them; and shifting scarce procurement resources to operation and maintenance of existing
systems must be reversed or it will bring us to our knees through Fiscal Death..."3
Gansler says quite frankly, no. It is impossible for the military to gain an advantage over
potential foes by spending the bulk of their government funds on the maintenance of
operating systems.
Gansler has referred to this type of behavior the military has permitted for years
as the "Death Spiral". This "Death Spiral" occurs when the increasing O&M costs for
aging equipment along with increased operation tempo requires the DoD to rob from
modernization to feed O&M needs. 3 This delays or stretches out modernization, and
reduces the quantities the US military can purchase by making it more expensive. Yet,
this leads to further delays in fielding new weapon systems causing older equipment to
3 Assistant Secretary of the Navy, "Navy High Yield Logistics Transformation Plan for FY00," May 5,
1998, pg. 77.
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remain in use, costing more to maintain, stealing from modernization, and thus
continuing the cycle until all of the US military resources are applied to operating and
maintaining our aging weapon systems.
Currently, the military has experienced several difficulties in meeting its
modernization objectives. These objectives are (1) to field high quality defense products
quickly and to support them responsively, (2) to lower the total ownership cost of defense
products and (3) to reduce the overhead cost of the acquisition and logistics
infrastructure.4 The reason why the US military has been unable to meet these objectives
is a direct result of the vast amount of money expended annually in sustaining current
operating systems. If one were to observe the complete federal budget by title for the
military (Figure 1.2), s/he would see the bulk of the money allocated to Operation &
Maintenance. When indeed, in order to modernize the military the concentration of funds
should be focused on Procurement. (Also note the vast difference in the O&M funds
compared to the other essentials for the US military.)
FIGURE 1.2: ToTAL DEFENSE BUDGET BY TITLE VS. FISCAL YEAR2
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4 http://www.defenselinkmil/pubs/affordability04091999.html
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Under a constant defense budget scenario, meeting mission requirements demands
that the US military implement solutions that provide more efficient ways to increase its
defense capabilities while reducing its O&M costs. As a result, the DoD has placed most
of its attention on why the O&M budget is so high, and if this allocated money can some
how be reduced, allowing for a budget increase in other specified areas, such as
Procurement.
Therefore, the US Navy and the military as a whole are presented with a problem.
How do they minimize the funds designated to operating and maintaining these systems?
One way is by making the system more sustainable. A sustainable system is one in
which the logistics, maintenance, and operations needs for that system have been
optimized in order to minimize cost incurred by the owner of that system.5
Due to the vast amount of money spent annually on maintenance, repair, and
overhaul (MRO) operations for systems in the US military and the competition between
private companies to support these operations, the DoD has gained a greater
understanding of the essentials of sustainability. This thesis will examine how an
American engine manufacturer designs sustainability into its product and what the results
of those design efforts have meant to the users and maintainers of the system.
This thesis will be based on case studies conducted on a set of military jet fighter
aircraft engines used by the US Navy and manufactured by a major American aerospace
engine company, who shall be referred to as Corporation Beta. The engine systems
studied will also be given an alias in order to protect the anonymity of the company.
5 Lewis, Spencer L., "Designing for Sustainability & Upgradability in an Aerospace System," May 5,
2000, pg. 10
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They shall be referred to as the ZM10-1 engine and the ZM10-2 engine, (these two
engines will be classified as the ZM10 engine family).
The Great Engine Wars
The relationship between the US Navy and Corporation Beta involving the
development of the ZM10 engine family resulted in what is known today as the "The
Great Engine War II". To understand this engine war it is important to recognize the
significance of the preceding engine war that took place. This engine war is notoriously
referred to as "The Great Engine War".
"The Great Engine War" took place between Corporation Alpha, the engine
manufacturer studied in the prior LSI research, and Corporation Beta, its biggest
competitor in the developing of engines arena. This engine war was brought about when
the US Air Force felt that Corporation Alpha, initially the sole provider of the power
plant for the F-15 Eagle and the F-16 Falcon, expressed a lack of concern of the engines
durability and reliability problems. As a result, the US Air Force began to support
Corporation Beta as a possible second engine source. In the end, the war resulted in a
draw insofar as production split was concerned; however, this competition between these
two engine manufacturers gave the government leverage over both contractors, which
resulted in reduced acquisition cost, more reliable and durable engines, and the inclusion
of contract warranties.6
In the early 1970s, the US Navy began the conception phase for a new fighter
aircraft. This aircraft, known today as the F/A- 18 Hornet, would be modified for aircraft
carrier suitability and would replace two of the Navy and Marine Corps first-line fighter
and attack aircraft, the F-4 and A-7 aircraft. The F/A- 18 Hornet aircraft would be in
6 Dabney, pg. 5
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operational service in the 1980s and 1990s. The next step would be to select a power
plant for the F/A- 18. These events would lead to what is dubbed today as "The Great
Engine War II".
Due to the problems the US Air Force encountered with Corporation Alpha, the
US Navy selected Corporation Beta to be the sole source producer of the power plant for
the Hornet. However, because of the lessons learned by the US Air Force in having only
one provider of an aircraft engine, the US Navy decided to implement a Second Source
Program. The primary goal of this program was to drive down production costs of all
major procurement programs via competition with Corporation Alpha. In the end, the US
Navy established an alternate qualified supplier and numerous vendors for the engine and
the acquisition cost was significantly reduced. The Navy's dual sourcing strategy was
eliminated due to reduced procurement quantities, financial pressures, and the near term
benefit of accepting a buyout offer by Corporation Beta.
It is important to note the relevance of these two engine wars. Firstly, these
engine wars established competition as a driving factor in the development of these
engine systems. Today, competition is used throughout the US military as a basic
premise in the acquisition process of major weapon systems. Secondly, these wars
shifted the primary objective of the engine system from overall engine performance to an
engine where reliability, maintainability, and sustainability (RM&S) were of equal
importance. This balance between performance and RM&S is still the greatest obstacle
seen today in the development of jet fighter aircraft engines.
17
1.1 Background Information
Since the inception of the first airplane in the US military, the sustainment of the
military aircraft has been a critical issue. This sustainment process includes everything
from repairing faulty parts, installing new and improved parts and materials, better
software, and new technologies that could provide the airplane with greater capabilities
and sustainment then initially conceived. Due to the delays in acquisition by the DoD, as
soon as a design for an airplane gets through the preliminary phase of development, the
software, as well as other parts on board the aircraft, are almost outdated due to advances
in technology spurred by the aerospace market. Most acquisition programs in the US
military averages about fifteen years. The DoD spends billions of dollars annually on
O&M tasks of the operating aircraft when in fact this money should be focused on
upgrading or replacing existing systems on board the aircraft or simply replacing the
aircraft (known as Procurement). Because of these delays in the next generation
weapons, the sustainment of aging aircraft has become a primary focus of the US
military.
The DoD's budget will remain approximately constant (after considering the
effects of inflation) for the foreseeable future; therefore, the budgets for the military
branches will also go unchanged. The US Navy budget projection for FY2000 shows
that the US Navy has only seen a slight increase in its operating budget (Figure 1.1.1).
The O&M budget for US Navy air operations has also only experienced a slight increase
in appropriated funds, while the funds appropriated to aircraft procurement has seen a
decrease in its appropriated funds.
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FIGURE 1.1.1: TOTAL US NAVY BUDGET VS. FIscAL YEAR7,8
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Note: Data shown in the figure above are projected figures from the FY2002 President's Budget.
From a first glance, the US Navy's budget profile seems favorable. If Procurement
dollars are significantly more than O&M dollars, then the US Navy could therefore steadily
upgrade its fleet while simultaneously supporting existing aircraft. Unfortunately, this is not the
case. As explained by Gansler, the US Navy, as well as the other branches of the military, are
guilty of taking funds from the Procurement fund to support the existing fleet to meet DoD's
most important requirement for the military: readiness.
Over the last ten years, the US Navy has observed its working budget rise and fall
with each new administration. The US Navy knows that every year their budget is
subject to change without notice. Therefore, they have decided to investigate a way to
utilize each dollar effectively. O&M tasks require hundreds of millions of dollars
Shttp://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2000/b02072000 bt045-00.html
8 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), "Operation and Maintenance, 0-1," FY 1999,
pg. 5.
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annually to maintain operating systems in the Navy, thus highlighting the sustainment of
its weapon systems as an opportunity to cut costs.
1.2 Thesis Motivation
In 1998, the MRO market for military aircraft was $3.5 billion dollars, 13.7% of
the total market, and had an expected growth rate of 3.6%.9 Aircraft engines composed
the largest percentage of this market. The Pentagon spends well over hundreds of
millions of dollars a year on its weapons support structure - with the biggest component
by far being the O&M budget. These facts, compounded with the DoD's declining
budget over the last ten years, have influenced the primary motivation of this study: by
focusing on the design of sustainment into aircraft engines, the DoD has the opportunity
to save millions of dollars annually in MRO expenditures.
The secondary motivation of this study is based on the prior Lean Sustainment
Initiative (LSI) fighter aircraft engine research. The prior LSI research examined how
Corporation Alpha, one of the country's leading manufacturers in military jet fighter
aircraft engines, designed reliability, maintainability, and sustainability (RM&S) into its
products and what the results of those design efforts have meant to the user and
maintainer of those systems, the US Air Force. It is the objective of this study to
investigate Corporation Beta, another leading manufacturer of military jet fighter aircraft
engines, and to study how their efforts to incorporate RM&S into their products have
affected the US Navy.
Over the last several years, it has become customary for the US military to keep
its weapon systems much longer than initially intended. This practice has caused serious
20
9 Frost & Sullivan, pg. 2
fluctuations in the O&M budget and has raised several issues on the RM&S
characteristics of the weapon system in question. In this thesis, reliability is a
characteristic that refers to the weapon system's dependability. Can the weapon system
be required to perform its task at any given moment? This is an essential role of the
weapon system. The military does not want to rely on a weapon system or systems that
will fail during the most critical times, not only endangering the operator but quite
possibly endangering the country's safety. In this thesis, maintainability is a
characteristic, which refers to a weapon system being able to be kept in an adequate,
operating condition. If a weapon system cannot be efficiently maintained, it is of
minimum value to the US military. In this thesis, sustainability is the characteristic that
refers to the MRO needs for that weapon system which have been optimized in order to
reduce costs incurred by the owner of that weapon system.5 Throughout my study of the
ZM10 engine family, I did not find any explicit use of the word sustainability in any
documents or interviews relating to Corporation Beta. Throughout my research, I did
conclude that Corporation Beta's attempts to address as well as improve reliability and
maintainability (R&M) in the engine systems resulted in an improvement in
sustainability. Therefore, throughout the remainder of this thesis any mention of
reliability and maintainability will automatically include sustainability unless noted
otherwise. This thesis will attempt to provide insight on how Corporation Beta and the
US Navy can best design aircraft engines to incur minimum lifetime costs.
1.3 Hypothesis
The prior LSI research showed the Unscheduled Engine Removal (UER) metric
was the best indicator in the investigation of the RM&S incorporated into Corporation
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Alpha's engine systems. To add more depth to the study, two other metrics were also
analyzed to compare the engine's RM&S characteristics as well as its overall
performance. These metrics were (1) Total Engine Removal (TER) and Scheduled
Engine Removal (SER). My study will focus on using the UER and SER metrics (due to
military availability), as well as the technologies, processes, tools, practices and policies
that were used in the development of the ZM10 engine family to investigate the engine
systems produced by Corporation Beta.
The hypothesis of this study is that each new engine derivative is designed with
better and more advanced sustainability features to make the engine more affordable
throughout the system's lifetime. Extrapolating from this hypothesis, if the sustainability
of each engine derivative produced by Corporation Beta were indeed improved, one
would observe the UER metric for each new engine derivative approaching a lower UER
value than that of earlier models. This also means that the cost of operating and
supporting future engine models will have reduced costs over existing engine models.
This thesis will investigate the relationship between Corporation Beta and the US
Navy in incorporating sustainment issues early in the design phases of the engine system,
and how this affects the members of the engine system's value stream. For all intent and
purposes, a value stream refers to every entity involved throughout the engine system's
lifetime. They may include the manufacturer, the pilot, the flight-line technicians, or any
person or organization responsible for the day-to-day activities of the engine system. It is
a major part of this thesis to uncover if there is any correlation between designing earlier
for sustainability and the incurred cost over the lifetime of the engine system.
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1.4 Key Research Questions
In order to test this hypothesis, a list of key questions was developed that will
allow me to fully understand Corporation Beta and the customer's perspective of the
RM&S characteristics of the engine systems by Corporation Beta. These questions are
as follows:
1.) What are the US Navy's past and present policies related to designing reliability,
maintainability, and sustainability into its jet fighter aircraft engines?
2.) What are the US Navy's past and present processes and practices used in the
reliability, maintainability, and sustainability of its jet fighter aircraft engines in the
following areas: (a) flight deck and (b) land?
3.) What were the driving factors that led to the upgrades in the ZM10 jet fighter aircraft
engines?
The first of these questions is essential in order to understand the policy
implications that might have affected the design process of this set of engines. Due to
prior engine programs within the US Navy or other branches of the military regarding
sustainment issues, this engine program could have experienced a different path then its
predecessors. If the policy on sustainment was changed prior to or during the middle of
the engine program, there could have been a different attitude regarding the design
process. There could have been people involved in the engine program familiar with past
programs that do not agree with these new policies and their resistance to this change
could cause a possible set back in the engine program development. This question is also
important because of the new environment that could be caused by a change in policy.
The policy could call for less money spent in the area of sustainment, faster turn around
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times for repairing items with fewer workers, or new ideas in implementing more
sustainment features in the engine program. All of these could affect the engine program.
The second question is important due to the complex manner in which these
engines are maintained whether at sea or land. Because this particular engine is housed
in a fighter aircraft on board an aircraft carrier, the development process of this engine
must have included this factor. If a problem occurs with the engine on board the carrier,
the appropriate tools must be on board the carrier in order to resolve the problem in an
appropriate amount of time. Knowing the answer to this question will provide me with
more insight into why certain RM&S characteristics were built into the engine.
It is also important to understand the processes and practices used in the RM&S
of these engines. Processes are defined as, the organizational and material-tracking
techniques used to develop engine systems.5 These processes include the interactions of
the individuals along the value stream of the engine program. If these processes are
complicated and are not fully accepted by all members of the value stream, there could be
an environment of hostility that is initiated which in turn could affect the successfulness
of the engine program. Practices are the particular ways in which one goes about doing a
particular task. In prior engine programs, there might have been a practice used in
replacing a faulty part, ordering a new part, reporting a problem with the engine. What
new practices have been adopted in the new engine programs and how will they make
this new engine family better than its predecessor?
Finally, the question must be answered, "What were the driving factors, which led
to the upgrades in the ZM1O jet fighter aircraft engines?" By knowing the answer to this
question, I can determine who initiated the next engine derivative. Was the customer
' Lewis, pg. 27
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dissatisfied with the ZM10-1 engine and as a result forced the manufacturer to build a
new, improved engine? The manufacturer could have discovered new advances in
technology that they believed would make the ZM10-1 engine better, or the manufacturer
saw this has an opportunity to make more money for the customer by building a new,
improved engine family and providing more services and guarantees in order to make
more money from its customer. This question must be answered in order to gain
proficient insight into what drove this upgrade.
1.5 Outline of Chapters
This thesis has been organized in the best logical way to display the collected
information, gathered data, and derived conclusions from the research and data analysis.
Chapter Two focuses on the research methods used in investigating this topic and
provides a description of the engine system studied. This chapter also illustrates the
research framework and its components utilized for this research investigation.
Chapter Three presents the data collected on policies, technology, practices,
processes and tools from the viewpoint of the US Navy. This chapter will also focus on
the US Navy's ideas and opinions of the ZM10 engine family.
Chapter Four also discusses the data collected on the policies, technologies,
practices, processes and tools from the viewpoint of Corporation Beta. This chapter will
also focus on the ideas and opinions gathered throughout this research investigation to
understand the efforts that the manufacturer implemented to designing RM&S into its
engine systems for the US Navy.
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Chapter Five analyzes the data presented in both Chapters Three and Four. This
chapter will also analyze the data collected from the Naval Air Systems Command
(NAVAIR) in Patuxent River, Maryland.
Chapter Six discusses the conclusions discovered throughout this research
process. This chapter will also provide recommendations of further studies of this engine
family and other aerospace systems as well as other ways to improve upon this research
study.
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Chapter 2: Research Methodology
In order to ensure a logical flow of the collection of data and information for this
thesis research, a formal research methodology was utilized. Several Internet searches
were conducted, and prior research from the Lean Aerospace Initiative (LAI) and LSI
were examined for this purpose. The research studied included previous theses in areas
ranging from supply chain management to the design of subsystems onboard an aircraft
as well as other relevant published literature. This was done to gain background
knowledge as well as to prevent duplication of a prior researcher's work.
2.1 Research Methodology
2.1.1 Internet Search
The first step in formulating this thesis research was to conduct a thorough
Internet search to learn more about the MRO industry. These searches provided essential
information on the current status of the world of MRO. Such examples include the
manner in which the military spends billions of dollars annually in its MRO operations,
and the fact that engines account for the most money expended in military MRO
operations provided preliminary detailed knowledge of the MRO industry.
In addition to providing a detailed understanding of the MRO industry, the
Internet search phase proved to be a successful medium in locating literature sources and
point of contacts for this research study. These two topics will be discussed further in
sections 2.1.2 Literature Search and 2.1.3 Summary of Point of Contacts, respectively, in
the thesis.
27
2.1.2 Literature Search
Following a thorough Internet search was the locating of relevant literature
sources dealing with sustainment, lean concepts, and the design process of jet fighter
aircraft engines. The MIT libraries proved to be a good resource of collecting the
appropriate papers for this research study.
Once a defined knowledge of the subject was attained, the next step in the
literature search was to locate past LAI and LSI theses that dealt directly with
sustainment. Studying these theses provided profound insight on military and
commercial trends for designing aerospace systems using sustainment principles.
Of the theses examined throughout the literature search phase, the most
motivating was entitled "Designing for Sustainability & Upgradability in an Aerospace
System". This thesis investigated how the US Air Force and Corporation Alpha, a
leading manufacturer of aerospace engines, adapted their design and development
practices to make the EG10 fighter engine family more reliable, durable, and
maintainable. The UER per 1000 Effective Flight Hours (EFH) was used to compare
sustainability of the different models of the EG1O engine family. A similar analysis was
then decided upon for another military jet fighter aircraft engine manufacturer,
Corporation Beta, and its attempts to design RM&S into its products, the ZM10 engine
family.
The literature search also included the collection of an important source for this
study. This source contains information on the policies used for the development of an
engine system for RM&S. This document is known as the DoD 5000 Series. This series
has been used since the 1970s to outline the military method of asset and weapon system
acquisition. The original DoD 5000 Series mandated a complicated acquisition process
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requiring the government to follow specific rules. The Series also contained supplemental
recommendations and suggested guidelines and other mandatory rules that apply only in
certain circumstances. The process was very detailed but was an attempt to ensure that
the US Government purchased only the highest quality equipment.
The new DoD 5000 Series, which originated in the mid 1990s, is accompanied
with a rewrite, which seeks to bring the rules of acquisition in line with the current
legislation that favor a streamlined acquisition process. This is done through the
incorporation of new laws and policies, separate mandatory policies and procedures from
discretionary practices, and reduced the volume of internal regulatory guidance. This
new DoD 5000 Series is also dramatically reduced in size overall. The older versions on
average were 1,000 pages long. The newer versions are an estimated length of 160
pages. The collection of the DoD 5000 Series, as well as other papers and articles
dealing with the design of the ZM1O engine family to basic sustainment issues, led to the
most important phase in the research study: contacting experienced professionals in the
field.
2.1.3 Summary of Point of Contacts
The first group of contacts was located via Internet. The titles of the contacts
were Contract Specialist for the ZM10 engine family, ZM15 Engine Deputy Assistant
Program Manager of Logistics, and F/A- 18 Propulsion Team Leader all of whom were
employed by NAVAIR at Patuxent River, Maryland. They were responsible for
providing the raw data for the ZM10 engine family, which will be further discussed in
Chapter Five of the thesis.
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The next contact located was Mrs. Patricia Toppings from the Directives and
Records Division of the DoD. She was responsible for supplying the old DoD 5000
Series, which could not be located via Internet or library. The reason why this source
could not be found over the Internet was because of the US military's policy on old
documents. Since the US military changes its policy so often, storing these files on the
World Wide Web would take up a large amount of space. Therefore, the US military is
only in the practice of keeping its most recent versions of the DoD 5000 Series uploaded
on the Internet. Most libraries are also not in the habit of storing older US government
files. The reason is mostly because of the size issue.
Professor Edward M. Greitzer from the Department of Aeronautics and
Astronautics at MIT suggested the last group of contacts. They were Mr. John Hsia,
former Manager of Manufacturing Technology Operation for Corporation Beta, and Mr.
Fred Ehrich, former Manager of Component Technology Operation for Corporation Beta.
These gentlemen provided supplemental information obtained in the initial stages of the
research as well as information not documented about this engine program.
2.2 Case Study
It is important to understand why the ZM10 engine family is such a good
candidate to study. The ZM10-1 engine was the first jet fighter aircraft produced by
Corporation Beta that was designed with reliability and maintainability issues from the
concept phase. This was the most convincing reason the US Navy chose the ZM10-1 to
power the F/A- 18 Hornet aircraft. This engine, which entered into service in 1981,
powers some 1,100 F/A-i 8A/B/C/D aircraft today across the world. This engine
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incorporates specific reliability and maintainability characteristics, which provides
durability and low cost ownership to the user of the system (see Table 2.2.1).
Reliability Characteristics Maintainability Characteristics
- overspeed/overtemp protection - six modules, fully interchangeable
- corrosion resistance * on-condition maintenance
- rotor containment * thirteen borescope ports
Table 2.2.1: ZM10 Engine Family Featuresl0
The first notable maintenance characteristic on board this engine is its modular
design. This engine has six modules: the fan, the high and low-pressure turbine, the
high-pressure compressor, the combustor, and the afterburner. This design allows for
rapid assembly and disassembly of the engine, which reduces maintenance times
significantly and makes it easier to maintain on-board a ship. The second notable
characteristic featured in this engine is the on-condition maintenance. This feature is
important for this engine because the Hornet aircraft is mostly housed on aircraft carriers.
Therefore, most of the complex problems that can occur within the engine should be able
to be fixed without sending a part or the whole engine to the depot. This leads to the last
maintenance characteristic: the thirteen-borescope ports. The idea of the borescope port
is to analyze specific areas of the engine (using computerized technology) to locate
problems within the engine in a timely fashion without the disassembly of the entire
engine.
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The specific performance characteristics of the ZM10-1 engine model can be seen
in Table 2.2.2.
By the early 1990's the ZM10-2 became the standard production power plant in
the F/A- 18 aircraft. This engine provided higher power, improved fuel efficiency, and
increased mission capability for the F/A-1 8C/D Hornet. It retained the design
characteristics of its predecessor, the ZM10-1, while achieving increased performance
through improved thermodynamic cycle and increased temperature. These improvements
in performance showed no loss in durability and were made possible by applying the
latest technology and materials to the turbine and afterburner sections of the engine.
The ZM10-2 engine has the same features as the ZM10-1 model. Its specific
performance characteristics can also be seen in Table 2.2.2.
Engine Length Maximum Weight, Max Powers Entered Maintenance
Model (in) Diameter Dry (ib) Thrust into Innovation
S(in) (lb) Service
ZM10-1 158.8 34.8 2,180 16,000 F/A- Feb 1981 Modular
18A/B/C/D
ZM10-2 158.8 34.8 2,282 17,700 F/A-18C/D Sept 1991 Modular
Table 2.2.2: ZM10 Engine Family Characteristics
2.3 Research Framework
The author of the prior LSI research entitled "Designing for Sustainability &
Upgradability in an Aerospace System" designed a research framework, which showed
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the relationships between policy, technology, processes, and tools. This same framework
will be used with one slight change incorporated. Its significance will be discussed in the
paragraphs to follow which will also explicitly outline the framework used in this study.
FIGURE 2.3.1: PRIOR LSI RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 5
Figure 2.3.1 is the framework that was used in the prior LSI research. The
framework that was used in this study can be seen in Figure 2.3.2.
FIGURE 2.3.2: RESEARCH FRAMEWORK
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2.3.1 Policy
A policy refers to any guidance or influence exerted by an agency or person that
impacts the decision making of those answering to the policy-making body in question.5
This guidance can be in the form of specific directives or instructions of the involvement
of sustainment in the design of the system, funding sustainment issues will receive, or the
use of the system. Other outside factors such as project leadership, a national threat, and
the current political climate of the country can also affect policy.
A change in leadership can cause a change in a system's sustainment policy.
Every leader brings with s/he a new set of ideas and methods of how to best implement
changes of improvement, including those related to the sustainment of a system. This
leader can be responsible for bringing forth great success to the system program or quite
similarly causing the downfall of a system program. These issues can have a serious
impact on the policies surrounding the system.
A potential threat to our country also has the ability to affect policy decisions
surrounding a system. For example, if our country is faced with a specific threat from a
foreign enemy, then the way in which DoD officials decide to enact policies for the
development or utilization of a system during the time of this threat could be quite
different if the tensions of this threat were decreasing. Therefore, the status of a potential
threat has the ability to seriously influence the manner in which our military decides to
create policies for the development and procurement of a system.
Other factors outside of politics have the ability to alter policy-making decisions
on sustainment issues. For instance, a set of politicians might feel a certain region of the
country should be the ideal site for depot maintenance of a jet fighter aircraft engine for
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the sake of increasing employment opportunities in that region. Funding of the system
program can also affect the sustainment of a system program. For example, Congress
may feel the performance of the system is more important than the sustainment costs or
vice versa. These are just a few examples of how a change in the current political climate
can have an effect on the policies surrounding the sustainment of the system.
2.3.2 Technology
Sustainment technology refers to the technological capabilities feasible with
aerospace systems in the field of sustainment offered by the manufacturer.5 As
sustainment policies are enacted and passed down to the US Navy, the manufacturer
responds by developing a system that is more sustainable as technology becomes more
readily available. This technology is discovered through years of research and
development, which includes areas from durable materials to better failure prediction
techniques. These developments are usually a direct result of these sustainment policies
and serve as a tool to capture defense contracts. In many instances, the manufacturer
develops improvements in the current sustainment technology with the hope of showing
the US Navy how committed their company is to designing sustainable systems, but
primarily with the hope of capturing higher profits.
2.3.3 Practices
Practices are the particular ways in which one goes about doing a particular task.
Sustainment policies can affect the practices carried out by both the manufacturer and the
user of the system. One example of a practice could be the manner in which the customer
orders a new part for the engine. Depending on the policy, the customer might have to go
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through a long paper signing process or quite the contrary the Project Manager (PM) may
be given the power in using his own judgment in ordering parts based on his working
knowledge of the situation. On the other hand, the manufacturer could also face a similar
situation with its practices given the current set of sustainment policies. If the
manufacturer uses on-line manuals and help options for its product, then the customer
must be digitally in sync with the manufacturer or the manufacturer is forced to use an
alternate method of relaying these types of information.
2.3.4 Processes and Tools
Processes are defined as, the organizational and material-tracking techniques used
to develop sustainment for an engine system.5 These processes include the interactions of
all the individuals along the value stream. They also specify how interactions along the
value stream will best produce a product that fulfills the customer's needs. Tools are
defined as the computerized models and techniques used to aid in the designing,
manufacturing and managing of the engine system.5 Processes and tools have been
combined into one section because some processes involve the use of tools and some
tools involve the use of processes. Distinguishing between the two can be quite a
difficult task; however, for this research, these differences are not important.
Processes and tools are also important on the user end of the value stream.
Whatever processes and tools currently in use can make the system easier to maintain.
For example, the processes and tools a flight-line technician uses to fix a part of the
engine. With easy to use tools and a fairly simple repair process, the technician can make
the appropriate adjustments in a fair amount of time. However, if the tools are too large,
complicated to use, and the repair process for an engine malfunction is a tedious one,
5 Lewis, pg. 27
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then the engine system program can be more costly and spend more time in the
maintenance stage. The policies implemented can improve processes and tools
throughout the value stream allowing for a more successful and sustainable engine
system.
2.3.5 Results
The results part of the framework is concerned with the overall performance
ratings of the engine system. The performance of the engine system is monitored through
the use of several numbers of metrics, depending on the user. An example of a metric
used by the US Navy to monitor the overall performance of an engine system is the UER
metric. This measures when there is a problem with the engine that cannot be fixed while
housed in the aircraft. This metric gives some indication of severity of the problem(s)
encountered with the engine system.
The results section explains the user's opinions of the specific engine system.
From Figure 2.3.2, the result block feeds back to the policy block of the framework.
Depending on the outcome of the engine system's sustainability performance, policy
makers can then decide to alter the current policies in place to either improve sustainment
or to maintain the current satisfactory level of sustainment for the engine systems that
will follow.
2.4 Data Analysis
The most important part of the research study is the analysis of the data collected.
This framework is organized in such a manner to observe how the data collected for each
part of the framework arrives at a logical conclusion through the use of both quantitative
data and qualitative data.
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Qualitative data used for this study is the information that was collected on
policies, practices, technology, processes and tools. This data provides the backbone for
this research. The quantitative data used for this study is the data obtained through
NAVAIR, which shows the actual performance of the ZM10 engine family. These two
types of data will be analyzed in detail. Furthermore, a conclusion will be drawn from
the analysis of the data and information collected to test whether or not the hypothesis
was correct.
38
Chapter 3: ZM1O Engine Program - Corporation Beta
Corporation Beta's first interaction with R&M occurred with the US Army's
DH10 engine system for the UH-60A Black Hawk helicopter. The US Army approached
Corporation Beta to address the issues encountered from past engine programs, especially
those from the US Army's involvement in the Vietnam War. The first issue was
protection from dirt to the engine system. The air intake into the engine system resulted
in several failures due to foreign object damage. This in turn led to several engine
removals, which in turn decreased the number of active helicopters that were mission
capable for the US Army. The second issue, which was a direct result of the first, was
modularity. Due to a high engine removal rate, the US Army realized the importance of
separating future engine systems into its major components using the simplest method
and in the fastest time. This led to the third and final issue: maintainability
demonstrations. The US Army wanted Corporation Beta to demonstrate the engine's
modularity. For the DH10 engine, the US Army required Corporation Beta to
disassemble the system using seven-hand tools and within a time frame of thirty minutes.
These improvements, which originated in the DH10 engine program, set the standard for
engine systems to follow at Corporation Beta, including the ME70 prototype engine
program.
3.1 ME70 Prototype Engine Program
The ME70 prototype engine program was a critical step in the development of
ZM10 engine family. In the mid 1960's, the need for a lightweight fighter aircraft was
defined by the US military to replace the current aging fighter aircraft. From the lessons
learned in the DH 10 engine program, the engine system for the lightweight fighter
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aircraft had to be both reliable and readily maintainable at a cost substantially less than
other engine systems available through the commercial market. As a result, the prime
objectives of this prototype engine program were to (1) tailor the engine configuration for
ease of installation in the aircraft and maintenance and (2) achieve low cost acquisition
and life-cycle cost."
The engine design proceeded with specific guidelines set by Corporation Beta.
They included the latest demonstrated engine technology and performance consistency
with reasonable cost. In order to meet these guidelines, Corporation Beta decided to
trade the engine system's ultimate performance levels with a much more simpler design.
To accomplish this task the organization developed a new mindset that would be used on
this prototype program as well as engine systems to follow. This new philosophy was
termed "Design-to-Cost". (This will be further discussed in section 3.5 of the thesis.)
It is important to note that this prototype engine program devoted no effort to
performance improvement. Its main purpose was to address and demonstrate the
fundamental R&M characteristics defined by the US military, which began to fund
Corporation Beta in its attempts to create an engine program that would eventually meet
future military requirements. The importance of this program was that it allowed for the
evaluation of a preliminary engine design not already dedicated to full-scale development
(FSD). Therefore, it permitted engineers to redesign specific components of the engine
to further simplify the design and improve R&M issues, which would be incorporated in
the final engine system.
After the ME70 prototype engine program concluded, the transition from this
program to the ZM1 0 engine system began. This transition resulted in a delay from the
" Rapp,pg.2
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prototype program to the ZM10 engine program, which in the end was favorable. This
delay allowed a maturation of technologies and components that would be incorporated
in the ZM10 engine system. This maturation would minimize the improvements that
would occur in the design and development phases of this engine system. The end result
was an engine system with twenty-one fewer parts, lower weight and cost, and reduced
maintenance complexity compared to its predecessor, the ME70 prototype engine."
3.2 Policy
Prior to the ME70 prototype engine program, the only factors of concern for
propulsion systems were pure performance and the procurement cost. Over the years, the
US military developed a better understanding of what was indeed important in the design
and development of an engine system. Therefore, when the US Navy selected
Corporation Beta to be the single sole provider of the ZM10 engine system, the US Navy
developed a new approach to setting the requirements they wanted met in the
development of this engine system. This new approach would be called the "New Look"
program.
This "New Look" program sought to improve the engine's durability through the
improvement of the engine's R&M. For example, the US Navy developed a priority
ranking of the ZM10 engine characteristics. They were:
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" Operational Suitability Most Important
e Reliability
* Maintainability
* Design-to-Cost
e Performance
0 Weight Least Important
As previously mentioned, it is seen through this priority ranking that the US Navy wanted
Corporation Beta to shift its focus from performance to R&M issues.
3.2.1 Corporation Beta's Organizational Structure
At the time this engine system was developed, Corporation Beta used what they
called a "matrix organization" to direct the day-to-day efforts of all the programs being
design and developed within their organization. A sample representation of Corporation
Beta's organizational structure can be seen in Figure 3.2.1. This structure ensured that
everybody had a part ownership in the product. For example, if the engine experienced a
problem with the combustion module, then the PM of combustion was at fault. This
method intended to localize the origin of the problems and issues experienced throughout
the design and development of the engine system.
As one can observe, this organizational structure was a dynamic one. The head of
the ZM10 engine program was the PM of the ZM10 (Projects). All the PMs of the other
groups, who played a role in the design, development, and manufacturing of the engine
system, reported directly to this position. This person set the day-to-day tasks of the
engine program and met weekly with the PMs of the other groups of the ZM10 engine
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FIGURE 3.2.1: A SAMPLE REPRESENTATION OF
CORPORATION BETA'S ORGANIZATIONAL
STRUCTURE
Etc.
program to obtain updates on the progressions and/or problems encountered by the
separate groups involved with the program.
It can be seen that R&M is located under technical discipline from Figure 3.2.1.
Over the years, its location changed throughout the company to Design Level to
Advanced Technologies, back to Technical Discipline. This occurred because the idea of
R&M was such a new concept within the company that at times they found it difficult to
categorize. However, R&M definitely played its role in the development of the engine
system as will be seen in section 3.2.2. It is important to note that the only reason
Corporation Beta designed and developed this engine with R&M issues is because the US
Navy unequivocally stated this as its primary concern for this engine system.
3.2.2 ZMJ 0 Engine Metrics
The US Navy has a set of engine metrics they use to track the R&M for an
engine system. From this list, Corporation Beta established their own set of engine
metrics to guide them with the design and development of the engine system. They
divided the metrics into three categories: Operating Costs, Readiness, and Mission
Completion. They were referred to as the "Bottom-Line Measures" because of their
direct effect on the customer's operating cost budget and ability to perform a specified
mission. These metrics are as follows:"
o Operating Costs
" Shop Visit Rate
" Line Replaceable Unit Removal Rate
* Maintenance Man-Hours Per Flight Hour
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" Parts Consumption Costs
" Parts Consumption and Labor Costs
o Readiness
* Mean Time Between Maintenance Action
" Unscheduled Engine Removal Rate
o Mission Completion
* Mission Abort Rate
* In-Flight Shutdown Rate
The metrics mentioned above were deemed the most important to the ZM10
engine program to meet R&M issues. Management used these metrics to track whether
or not R&M issues were indeed being improved upon throughout the development of this
engine system. Monthly reviews were held about these metrics to further ensure that
satisfactory progress was made in the improvement of this engine system's R&M issues.
3.3 Technology
Since the US Navy placed such an emphasis on R&M issues, a major goal of
this engine program was to simplify the engine design as much as possible. Corporation
Beta referred to this as "Simplicity through Advanced Technology".' 3 In this, they
attempted to accomplish two things. Firstly, they wanted to decrease the number of parts
in the engine system. This was mostly because parts count was a direct driver of the
engine system's reliability and costs. Secondly, they wanted to reduce the complexity of
the individual components. In achieving these two objectives, Corporation Beta based its
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technology foundation on previous jet fighter aircraft military engine programs produced
within the company. Most of the technological refreshments were direct results of
lessons learned by other engine programs.
3.3.1 ZM10-1 Engine Technology
The single most important technological improvement seen in the ZM10-1 engine
system was its modular design. Modularity is the idea of separating the engine into its
basic essential components. For the ZM1O-1 engine system, there were six modules.
These were the fan, the high and low-pressure turbine, the high-pressure compressor, the
combustor, and the afterburner. Modularity permitted the engine to be serviced in a
relatively new fashion for this time. In the past, if the engine experienced a malfunction,
the entire engine was removed, which decreased the mission capability and readiness
metrics for the fleet. Removing the entire engine also increased the probability of
damaging other parts of the engine system and increased the amount of money spent in
the total removal of the engine system. However, with this new advancement in
technology, instead of the whole engine being removed and sent to the depot for
maintenance, only the malfunctioned module was taken out of the engine bay to serviced.
This resulted in a decrease in the Maintenance Man-Hours Per Flight Hour metric and the
Unscheduled Engine Removal Rate metric.
Another important technological advancement in the ZM10-1 engine system was
the Digital Electronic Control (DEC) unit, which simplified the design as well as the
operational use and maintenance of the engine's control system. Backup control
schedules can be easily added to the DEC, which improved the single seat aircraft's
reliability. For example, the original ZMlO-l control system consists of two main
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control components: a hydromechancial Main Fuel Control (MFC) and the Electronic
Control Unit (ECU). In the event of a failure of the MFC and/or the ECU, the backup
control of the DEC takes over full authority of engine schedules and can deliver the full
range and modulation of engine thrust without throttle restrictions. The built-in-tests of
the DEC constantly monitor the electrical control system functions and provide automatic
switching to these backup modes if necessary.
Other technological advancements were met in the ZM10-1 engine system
program. These improvements were in the areas of new materials, cooling techniques,
and high-speed aerodynamics. They were also incorporated in the engine system to
reduce the number of engine parts in the ZM10-1 engine system. As a result, the
complexity, weight, and spare parts cost were reduced dramatically.
3.3.2 ZM10-2 Engine Technology & The Upgrade Process
Growth studies were already being conducted for the ZM10-1 engine program
before the engine entered into FSD. These studies included the incorporation of the
advanced materials technology and the issue of performance. However, once the US
Navy expressed the sentiment of an engine system with ten to twenty percent more thrust
power than the ZM10-1 engine system, the ZM10-2 engine program was born. These
growth studies conducted by Corporation Beta for the ZM10-1 engine system program
used previous jet fighter aircraft military engine and demonstrator programs as a
reference for the design and development of the ZM10-2.
Besides increasing the thrust power of the ZM10-2 engine system, the single most
important development criteria for this engine system was the issue of commonality,
which would reduce development cost and logistics impact. Corporation Beta selected a
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configuration for the ZM10-2 engine system that fit and functioned interchangeably with
the improved part designs in the ZM10-1. This provided the US Navy with the option of
either selecting the ZM10-1 engine system's improved parts or upgrading the entire
engine system.
Another sizable step for the ZM10-2 engine system was the Full Authority
Digital Electronic Control (FADEC) with a fail-operational backup system. The FADEC
design incorporated fault isolation circuitry and digital data bus. This allowed the
monitoring and analysis of engine control system faults on the aircraft cockpit displays or
through a ground station without opening the engine access doors. The circuitry could
distinguish between faults in the control system sensors and those located in the FADEC
to avoid unnecessary and expensive removals and troubleshooting of the control unit
when it is not at fault. This FADEC design significantly reduced cost and risk with the
ZM10-2 engine system. It also uniquely suited the future demands for increasing
integration of aircraft and engine control systems.
3.4 Processes and Tools
In accordance with the US Navy's "New Look" program, Corporation Beta
devised a list of processes that would direct them in establishing the R&M requirements
for the ZM10-1 engine system. These processes were:"
* Simulated-Mission Endurance Test (SMET)
" Accelerated Service Test (AST)
* Reliability Tracking
* Maintainability Demonstrations
Rapp, pg. 5
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" Accelerated Mission Test (AMT)
" New 150-Hour Endurance Test
Their contribution, significance, and design tools used for the ZM1 0 engine program will
be discussed in the following sections.
3.4.1 Simulated-Mission Endurance Test (SMET)
Previous jet fighter aircraft engine programs encountered one common problem.
They lacked a realistic endurance test that would test for potential problems and/or
component failures the engine system would experience once operational. The SMET
was developed as a result of the lessons learned from these past programs. The SMET
was a 150-hour endurance test that demonstrated engine durability and evaluated engine
reliability on a real-time basis.
The goal set forth by the US Navy was a minimum reliability level of 72-hours,
which would be monitored through the Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) metric.
Corporation Beta demonstrated a MTBF rate of 165-hours, resulting in an incentive
award for their accomplishment. The ZM10-1 engine experienced three UERs in 250-
hours of operation. Once the SMET was concluded, the condition of the engine system
was evaluated and considered to be in an excellent state of condition.
3.4.2 Accelerated Service Test (AST)
The AST did not commence until the actual flight-testing of the F/A-18 aircraft.
The test called for the engine to endure a total of 1,000 flight hours. The test schedule
was divided into two phases. Corporation Beta conducted the first stage. During the first
500 flight hours, Corporation Beta would fly the aircraft and maintain the engine system,
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while the second portion of the test was conducted under the supervision of the US Navy.
The AST was used to assess the engine system's capability of flying a variety of mission
tasks. Throughout specific checkpoints of the test schedule, the US Navy would express
their concerns with particular R&M matters of the engine system. Corporation Beta
would then attempt to rectify these issues, and the AST resumed.
3.4.3 Reliability Tracking
The US Navy experienced several problems with the mechanical components of
the aircraft engine system housed on aircraft carriers in past engine programs after only a
few missions were flown. The US Navy decided that reliability was an important factor
that should be addressed in the design and development of the ZM10-1 jet fighter aircraft
engine. (The US Navy tracked reliability through the UER metric). As a result,
Corporation Beta developed a reliability tracking program with an established goal of
165-hours for the end of the engine program. The company measured reliability through
the unscheduled component removal rate of the engine system. Throughout
development, each component failure was followed by a report defining the cause of the
problem along with a coherent, corrective action technique. At the end of the
development program, Corporation Beta reached a 293-hour goal well in surplus of the
initially established goal and was awarded a monetary bonus for their achievement.
3.4.4 Maintainability Demonstrations
The maintainability demonstration was a very important requirement of the US
Navy. The US Navy did not want to be told of the excellent new achievements
accomplished by Corporation Beta for the engine system. They wanted it demonstrated.
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The US Navy wanted an engine system where engine components and modules could be
replaced without removing the entire engine system.
These demonstrations were divided into two phases. Corporation Beta conducted
the first phase where they showed that the engine system met the modularity requirement
expressed by the US Navy. During the second phase, the US Navy examined and
evaluated the engine system to see if the engine system resolved their maintainability
concerns. Measurement times of installing and removing the components and modules of
the engine system were recorded. Corporation Beta received lower times in all but one of
the 42 time requirements established by the US Navy. In most instances, these
improvements were substantial.
3.4.5 Accelerated Mission Test (AMT)
Corporation Beta developed an endurance test to address the issue of expensive
maintenance and spare parts. This test was called the Accelerated Mission Test (AMT).
The AMT was not a new endurance test. In the past, this test was used during FSD of the
engine system. Corporation Beta decided to implement this endurance test in the design
phase of this engine program.
The AMT tested the accelerated cyclic performance of the engine system and was
administered in conjunction with the SMET. However, the AMT proved to be more
successful in obtaining more relevant data for engine operation per test hour and
accelerated the overall leaning process of the engine system. It was also used to identify
the service needs and requirements prior to the FSD of the engine system.
The AMT (as well as other endurance tests) were methods to produce a real-life
flying environment for the engine system. These tests were used to recognize potential
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problems with the engine or component design before the engine system reached FSD. It
is important to note Corporation Beta's viewpoint of these endurance tests. They
commended the tests for its efforts to reproduce the real-life flying conditions. However,
they felt the real test of the engine system would only come during the actual flight test
and simple field experience. New problems and failures will always occur during these
phases of FSD.
3.4.6 New 150-Hour Endurance Test
This new endurance test was implemented to eliminate inessential testing
techniques seen in other engine system programs. It would include testing the engine
system under the most realistic flight conditions for the F/A- 18 aircraft. It would include
81 -hours of testing at sea level, and the remaining hours would be conducted at the other
critical operating points forecasted for potential mission tasks for this aircraft once
operational. In the attempt to recreate a realistic environment, 50% of the testing stage
was held at maximum operating conditions for this engine system.
3.4.7 Design Tools
The ZM10-1 engine program was the first engine system at Corporation Beta that
used computer graphics in the design and development of an engine system. These
computer graphics consisted of the use of a 2-D computer-drafting tool that was
specifically used in the designing of the components for the entire engine system. This
tool saved a considerable amount of time on the assembly line because of the precision of
the components with the 2-D computer design tool. However, because this tool only
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accounted for two dimensions, mock-up models still needed to be developed to actually
exhibit the component's actual size and compatibility with the rest of the engine system.
3.4.8 ZM1 0 Engine Reliability Program
Due to the US Navy's high priority on reliability, Corporation Beta originated a
reliability program to address the R&M issues of the ZMlO engine system. This program
was structured for the identification of potential problems early, the measurement of the
program's progress, and rapid corrective action where needed. In addition to meeting
these R&M requirements, the US Navy also provided goals for the reliability program
that were to be met at specific checkpoints in the design and development process.
Furthermore, monetary awards would be given to Corporation Beta if these goals were
met and the acquisition process remained on schedule.
The sole purpose of the reliability program was to ensure that reliability was
considered throughout every phase of the design and development process. Corporation
Beta implemented a set of assessment tasks, generated by the designers and the reliability
engineers, to guarantee that this was the case. This list of tasks were:12
* Provide program plan and updates e Identify reliability critical items
" Review specs., design, and drawings e Prediction vs. goals
* Conduct reliability design reviews e Assist logistics support
* Technical assistance e Integrate with safety/maintainability
* Establish and apply numerical criteria and e Review failure reports/corrective action
allocations
* Provide tech. Assistance in design and e Measure and assess
other trade studies
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0 Review vendor design specs. * Review design changes
e Periodic technical reports
To meet this list of requirements created by the engineers of Corporation Beta the
Reliability Program was established containing the elements of analysis, test, and
corrective action. This program included Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality
Analyses (FMECA), Vendor/Subcontractor Controls, Reliability Critical Items, Design
Reviews, Prediction/Allocation, Corrective Action System, and Measurement and
Assessment. 12
FMECA was considered an important analysis in the design process. The failure
modes were assessed according to the effect of each failure mode on engine operation.
While, the analyses considered single failure modes and selected combinations of failure
modes, which might have critical effects on the engine system. Other forms of analysis
included: component and part identification, and description of component function,
details on failure mode, location, and probable causes of failure, and effects of each
hypothesized failure on the components and engine system, including potential
maintenance action requirements as well as mission effects. This analysis was important
in locating the weak links in the design and indicating the direction for corrective action.
The vendor/subcontractor controls were a way to ensure that the components
designed and purchased from the subcontractors met the program requirements. While,
the reliability critical items were a list of those components whose possible failure effects
were identified as critical, plus other hazards that had a high organizational-level failure
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rate. This list was maintained and reported regularly to the US Navy to ensure that
corrective action was used to resolve these issues.
The design review dealt with the formal review of the design as reliability is
concerned. For example, primary to the implementation of the reliability program, a
design of a component or part of the engine required a signature from the PM of the
ZM10 engine program before it entered into the next phase of development. Due to the
R&M concern issues expressed by the US Navy, before the design would reach the PM
of the ZM10, it first had to be approved by a Reliability Engineering representative of the
reliability group. If a signature was not received, the design had to be altered until the
reliability requirements were satisfied. With the sign-off of the reliability group's
approval, the design then moved to the next stage of the design process after the approval
of the PM of the ZM10.
Prediction was concerned with preparing quantitative allocation of mature
reliability values early in the design phase. While, allocations were made to the
subsystem and component levels. Corrective Action System dealt with the manner in
which failures/hazards and potential failures/hazards were solved.
Measurement/Assessment dealt with the goals that were established by the US
Navy early in the design phase and assessing the actual values with these requirements.
One can understand through these analyses and tests, Corporation Beta put forth its
greatest effort in addressing R&M issues of the ZM10 engine system.
3.5 Practices
In an attempt to produce an engine system for the low cost, lightweight fighter
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aircraft, Corporation Beta developed a "Design-to-Cost" concept. This new idea used
performance and cost tradeoffs to reduce the overall cost of the ZM10-1 engine system.
This concept tracked the cost for the engine versus time (Figure 3.5.1). Corporation Beta
FIGURE 3.5.1:
"DESIGN-TO-COST" GRAPHICAL
REPRESENTATION
Target
A
pp.
Time
Reduction in cost of
engine system through
new materials, Engine tests began
technologies, etc. and more problems
were found
began by setting a target price for the engine system and worked towards reaching this
goal and below. Every component in the engine system had a "Design-to-Cost" plan.
Once a week, the PMs met to report their progress in developing a cheaper component
and proposed an alternative plan (if the present plan was faulty) to further reduce the cost.
This was done to set a price limit on the total cost of the engine system. From Figure
3.5.1, one can observe that as time progresses, the total cost for the engine system
decreases, increases, and then smoothes out. This behavior occurred because in the initial
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phases of design only reduction in cost issues were addressed. As the engine program
matured, other problems appeared throughout the engine-testing phase. These problems
revolved around R&M, performance measures, component lifetime, etc. The graph then
smoothes out because the company exhausted all other alternatives in design and R&M
improvements to construct an engine system with a lower cost then the one already
established. After the engine system, was developed, a price was tabulated which
included labor costs, parts cost, materials, methods, etc. In the end, a total cost was
established and Corporation Beta marked up the cost in order to make a profit.
3.6 Lessons Learned
Corporation Beta maintains a file on the lessons learned from past engine
programs. This was done to avoid making the same mistakes and to quicken the
development process in future engine programs. For the ZMlO engine programs, this
was also the case. The most important lessons learned are stated below:"
" Clearly defining the engine objectives early in the program will avoid major
design revisions throughout the development program which would result in a
lower cost for the engine system,
* Integrating both engineering and manufacturing could also result in a lower cost
for the engine system,
* A prototype engine program is a cheap method of experimenting with new and
different design techniques in producing a lower cost engine system,
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" The transition from the prototype program to the actual engine program should
allow enough time for technology maturation before the engine system reaches
FSD, and
" Knowing the actual engine definition and how the aircraft will be flown, will aid
in the design and development stages by allowing the company to select the
appropriate endurance tests to predict component and engine life times.
There is not much difference seen in the ZM10-2 engine program and its
predecessor. The ZM10-2 engine program used the same policies, technologies,
processes and tools, and practices in its development process. The only major difference
in the two programs is that the ZM10-2 engine program evolved from the US Navy's
need for more power from the currently used propulsion system for the F/A- 18 aircraft.
These lessons learned from the ZM10-1 and ZM10-2 engine programs provided
essential information to the development of the following jet fighter aircraft engine
system produced by Corporation Beta for the US military, the ZM15 engine. For
example, the matrix organization was a preliminary track to forming Integrated Product
Teams (IPTs). This engine program was the first engine system produced by this
organization, which used IPTs with defined goals. Another advancement was the use of
3-D solid modeling for the engine system and its components. This saved even more
time in the assembly and design processes of the engine system. The lessons learned
from the ZM10 engine family set forth the ground work in the production of an engine
system that had more power, better R&M characteristics, and a reduction in the total cost
of the engine system seen in the ZM15 engine system.
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Chapter 4: ZM1O Engine Program - US Navy
In the early 1970s, the US Navy challenged Corporation Beta to develop an
engine system for the F/A- 18 Hornet aircraft that would focus on R&M concerns. Prior
to this time, the US Navy had experienced several problems with current propulsion
systems for their aircraft fleet. The two main problems were fleet readiness and life-
cycle support costs. Fleet readiness is a highly observable metric in the US military.
This metric conveys the availability of the military's weapon systems at any given time.
This metric is also understandably important to the US Navy whose mission states that
they are "to maintain, train and equip combat-ready naval forces capable of deterring
aggression and maintainingfreedom of the seas. "3 In the preceding years, the readiness
of the US Navy's aircraft fleet plummeted a disgraceful and unacceptable 30%, mostly
due to problems/failures experienced in the engine system. The second experienced
problem was a result of poor reliability characteristics of past engine programs. The
majority of the US Navy's aircraft only flew an average of two missions before they were
grounded due to engine problems/failures. This caused the US Navy to expended extra
funds operating and maintaining these aging engine systems. These two issues resulted
in a partnership between the US Navy and Corporation Beta to develop an engine system
for the Hornet aircraft that would be reliable, easily maintainable, and would reduce the
overall life-cycle costs. This marked the beginning of the ZM1O engine program.
4.1 Policy
The US Navy's policies for the ZM1O engine systems are unambiguously defined
13 http://www.navv.mil
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in the DoD 5000 Series. This document states the policies, as well as the procedures, the
US Navy are to follow for the development of these particular engine systems including
other weapon systems procured by the US military. Unfortunately, due to a lack of
government cooperation, I was unable to acquire the older versions of the DoD 5000
Series; especially those documents used to outline the policies and procedures the US
Navy were to follow for the ZM10 engine programs. Therefore, in order to develop an
understanding of the mindset of the US Navy for these engine programs, I researched the
primary objectives of the past Secretaries of Defense throughout the life times of these
engine systems.
In the following sections, I will present the objectives of the Secretaries of
Defense spanning over the life times of these engine systems (section 4.1.1), the current
acquisition policy for the US military (section 4.1.2), and a new concept that the US
Navy used for the ZM10 engine programs but was only adapted to the DoD 5000 Series
recently (section 4.1.3).
4.1.1 Summary of Past Secretaries of Defense
The Secretary of Defense is responsible for the formulation and enactment of
general defense policy, which is clearly outlined in the DoD 5000 Series. Every
Secretary of Defense has the opportunity to implement a new set of regulations and rules
issued through this document, under the direction of the President of the United States.
(NOTE: The DoD 5000 Series is actually managed by the Under Secretary of Defense,
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, formerly known as the Under Secretary of
Defense, Acquisition and Technology, who works under the supervision of the Secretary
of Defense.) As observed in past administrations the primary objectives for the Secretary
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of Defense can and will change. This is uniquely seen throughout the life times of the
ZM10 engine programs.
When the ZM10-1 engine program entered into its concept phase of the
development process, Melvin R. Laird (January 22, 1969 - January 29, 1973) was the
Secretary of Defense. Laird's objectives were simple (1) decrease the military budget
and (2) reduce the size of the military establishment. These objectives placed an
enormous amount of pressure for the US Navy to ensure that the engine system for the
F/A- 18 aircraft was not only reliable and easily maintainable but to reduce the life-cycle
support costs. Laird's threats of DoD budget reductions left very little room for the US
Navy to afford millions of dollars annually in servicing and maintaining engine systems
alone. Laird's objectives in addition with lessons learned from past engine programs led
to the US Navy to develop the "New Look" program. This program would focus on
R&M concerns for the engine system, which would eventually result in a lower total cost
of ownership of the system.
The next few Secretaries of Defense, Elliot L. Richardson (January 30, 1973 -
May 24, 1973), James R. Schlesinger (July 2, 1973 - November 19, 1975) and Donald H.
Rumsfeld (November 20, 1975 - January 20, 1977), disagreed with their predecessor.
They felt that a decrease in the defense budget would only hinder the United States armed
forces. These men fought hard to increase defense spending, and they succeeded. They
believed that the US military lagged behind their enemies' technologies and capabilities
and felt an increase in military spending could only strengthen the US armed forces
making them more competitive in the outbreak of a national or international conflict.
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The next Secretary of Defense focused his attention on managing the DoD.
Harold Brown (January 21, 1977 - January 20, 1981) was known for his excellent
organizational and managerial skills. He placed a heavy emphasis on understanding how
the DoD worked and tried to establish a business framework for the organization to
follow. His term ended believing that this task could not be accomplished.
His successor was Casper W. Weinberger (January 21, 1981 - November 23,
1987). Weinberger was not widely known for his experience in defense matters.
However, he was known for his ability as an administrator and would be known for
establishing a U.S. defense that was modernized. The key words for his defense program
were readiness, modernization, and sustainability. He was the first Secretary of Defense
to place sustainability on their list of objectives for the US military. He believed that
modernizing the US military would be accomplished through the sustainment of aging
weapon systems. Poor sustainment characteristics in current weapon systems was the
main reason for expending extra funds for O&M of these systems and a delay in a much
needed procurement of new, better, improved and advanced systems for the US military.
The next two Secretaries of Defense who began to show an emphasis on
reliability, maintainability as well as sustainability were William J. Perry (February 3,
1994 - January 23, 1997) and William S. Cohen (January 24, 1997 - January 20, 2001).
Their main objectives were ensuring military readiness and modernization through a
defense acquisition reform. They wanted to change the way the military conducted its
day-to-day business affairs. The current Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld
(January 20, 2001 - Present), believes in this acquisition reform as well. He believes it
will lead to modernizing the current aging weapons systems and the procurement of new
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weapon systems by making them more reliable, maintainable, and sustainable. He also
introduced a new section on sustainment policy for weapon systems in a change of the
most current version of the DoD 5000 Series twenty years after the concept was formally
introduced to the US military. Although these Secretaries of Defense did not explicitly
place their direct attention on the ZM10 engine systems, their decisions played a major
role throughout the life times of these systems and future requirements on engine systems
for the US military.
4.1.2 Current Acquisition Policy
Older versions of the DoD 5000 Series did not explicitly address R&M issues in
procuring new engine systems. However, from projected budget cuts to lessons learned
from past engine programs, the US Navy understood their importance. They began to
focus their attention on these issues for the ZM10 engine systems without a formal set of
procedures mandated by the DoD. The US Navy developed a "New Look" program for
these engine systems, which would focus on R&M issues, and as a result, the engine
systems would be more durable and a reduction in the overall total cost of ownership
would be observed.
In March of 1996, the DoD released a new version of the DoD 5000 Series and in
June of 2001, under the supervision of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, they produced an
updated version of this document. These documents listed several new policies for
acquisition and procurement. They also explicitly address policies dealing with
supportability, reliability, availability, and maintainability, and life-cycle resource
estimates, which I have deduced as DoD's way of categorizing RM&S. I have compared
the two documents and noted the important differences. This is done to develop a better
63
understanding of the advancement of sustainment thinking of the US military at the top
levels of management. The document separates the RM&S issues into supportability,
reliability, availability, and maintainability (RAM), and life-cycle resource estimates. I
will compare the two documents on their respective policies on these issues.
4.1.2.1 Supportability
The supportability principle is located under the "Program Design" sections for
both documents. More specifically, it is located under "Acquisition Logistics". They
both have the same under of underlying policies under "Acquisition Logistics". They
are: Supportability Analyses, Support Concepts, Support Data, and Support Resources.
"Acquisition Logistics"
The most recent version points out the PM's management activities throughout
the end of the system's life-cycle whereas the prior is concerned with the PM's
management activities throughout the development phase of the system. The most recent
version has a plan, which encounters an evolutionary acquisition strategy for the system's
development. They both consider the principle of the system's cost to be important in
every decision in the program's development.
"Supportability Analyses"
Both policies are very much the same in content though the most recent version is
much more detailed. It explicitly states that these analyses will be considered for new
procurements, major modifications, upgrades, reprocurement of systems, subsystems,
components, spares and services procured after initial contract award. It also introduces
cost-effectiveness as the underlying theme.
"Support Concepts"
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Both policies are very similar in content as well. The newer version introduces
the principle of total ownership cost and many more detailed examples of how to support
systems within the US military.
"Support Data"
While both are still very similar in content, the most recent version introduces the
idea of fostering competition among sources of support throughout the life cycle of the
fielded system.
"Support Resources"
Once again, both of these policies in the two documents are very similar in
content. However, the most recent version discusses the importance of support resources
to "each increment of introduced capability"'4 of the system. Also, it discusses support
and services to be competitively sourced.
With the June 2001 DoD 5000.2-R, there is an accompanying Support Strategy in
the document. This document is developed by the PM. This support strategy considers
all relevant factors for life-cycle sustainment and continuous improvement of product
affordability, reliability, and supportability, while sustaining readiness.
4.1.2.2 Reliability, Maintainability, and Availability
Both of these policies are found in the "Program Design" sections of their
respective documents. The most recent version has renamed the heading to RAM. Both
documents are very similar in content. The most recent version explains how Modeling
and Simulation shall be used in demonstrating RAM requirements to reduce costs.
14 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), "Mandatory
Procedures for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) and Major Automated Information
System (MAIS) Acquisition Programs," June 2001, pg. 82.
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4.1.2.3 Life-Cycle Resource Estimates
The most recent version is much more detailed. It explicitly discusses analysis of
multiple concepts, analysis of alternatives, affordability, and resource estimates. There is
also an introduction and explanation of the benefits of the system/mission as a cost
function in this section. This policy discusses the importance of a dollar amount for the
system program for the entire life cycle. There are to be random updates on this dollar
amount to make sure the number is not rising or is considered to be an acceptable figure
for this system program. Different acquisition programs have a different set of rules to
follow. For example, an acquisition program, which cost $30 million dollars, has a
different set of policies than one that cost $100,000 dollars.
The earlier version only goes into "Life-Cycle Cost Estimates" and "Manpower
Estimates". While the current version goes into both of these policies in depth, they also
take on the following principles in detail.
"Analysis of Multiple Concepts"
This section is concerned with concept exploration. Investigating different
concepts based on the realism of the concept along with cost and schedule which is
acceptable to the user.
"Analysis of Alternatives"
The analysis of the different algp"yes is q part of the cost as an independent
variable (CAIV) process. This analysis broadly examines the multiple elements of the
program or project alternatives including technical risk and maturity, and costs.
"Affordability"
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Affordability is the degree to which the life-cycle cost of an acquisition program
is in consonance with the long-range investment and force structure plans of the DoD or
individual DoD components.
"Resource Estimates"
Resource estimates deals with the PM's plan to prepare a life cycle cost estimate
for all acquisition programs initiation decisions and at all subsequent program decision
points. It explicitly explains the Life-Cycle Cost Estimates, Manpower Considerations,
and Manpower Estimates.
4.1.2.4 Sustainment Policy
The rewrite of the most current DoD 5000 Series, called the 5000.2, Change 1, for
the first times develops a clear definition of sustainment for the US military. Sustainment
incorporates "the execution of a support program that meets operational support
performance requirements and sustainment of systems in the most cost-effective manner
for the life cycle of the system."' 5 It further explains what sustaining a system means.
"The sustainment program includes all elements necessary to maintain the readiness and
operational capability of deployed systems. The scope of support varies among programs
but generally includes maintenance, sustaining engineering, survivability, etc."' 5 It
continues with a definition of evolutionary sustainment, which is "sustainment strategies
must evolve and be refined throughout the life cycle, particularly during development of
subsequent blocks of an evolution strategy, modifications, upgrades, and reprocurement.
This strategy will also include consideration of the full scope of operational support, such
15 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics),
"DoD 5000.2, Change 1 Department of Defense Instruction," January 4, 2001, pg. 30.
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as maintenance, sustaining engineering, disposal, etc." 6 This sustainment policy for
weapon systems concludes with a description of how the system will be demilitarized and
disposed of in an appropriate manner.
4.1.3 Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV)
Although the US Navy developed a cost-effective mentality in the
procurement of the ZM10 engine systems, CAIV is fairly a new concept within the DoD.
It requires that in the beginning stages of the acquisition program the PM must use the
CAIV method to develop a total ownership cost for the program. They are to balance
mission needs and projected changes and/or improvements in the program's resources of
both DoD and defense industries with cost. The CAIV method believes in early planning
and forces the PM to treat cost as an essential military requirement. An incentives
program will also be enacted to ensure that cost is a driving factor in the acquisition
process. Therefore, competitive tactics will be enforced to drive down life cycle costs of
potential programs.
4.2 Technology
The US Navy believes the most important technological advancement to consider
R&M issues for the ZM10 engine systems is its modular design. They have gained
several benefits from the incorporation of this technology. One of these benefits is a
more easily maintainable engine system. The modular design allows for the specific
problematic modules and/or components to only be removed from the engine bay. These
modules and/or components can then be serviced or sent to the depot for maintenance
16 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics),
"DoD 5000.2, Change I Department of Defense Instruction," January 4, 2001, pg. 31.
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while the engine is still installed in the aircraft. As a result, the US Navy experiences an
increase in fleet readiness, a decrease in total man-hours, and a decrease in costs incurred
for expensive maintenance techniques as well as transportation fees.
Another benefit is a reduction in the probability of damaging other components of
the engine system. The engine removal process is a cautious and precise one; however,
there have been many instances when other components have been damaged during this
process. As a result, more expensive tests were conducted and more components were
replaced. This in turn led to an increase in the total overall cost of ownership for the US
Navy. Although there is still a probability in damaging other parts of the engine system
during scheduled and unscheduled service checks of the engine system, it has been
dramatically reduced with the inclusion of this modular concept.
The addition of the borescope technology is another valued R&M characteristic
for these engine systems. This feature allows the flight-line technician to examine the
engine system and discover potential failures modes/problems while the engine is still
positioned in the aircraft by using the borescope-computerized technology. These
borescopes significantly reduce the overall time needed for maintenance of the engine
system as well as the time expended to service the engine.
4.3 Processes and Tools
The US Navy has a long tradition of incorporating lessons learned from past
weapon system programs in new acquisition programs. This is done with the hope of
developing a better and improved weapon system. This was also the case for the ZM 10
engine systems. The US Navy studied past engine programs with the expectation of
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resolving the problems observed with R&M for the engine systems for the F/A- 18
aircraft. This study produced the objectives for the US Navy's "New Look" program.
The US Navy included several new elements that they felt would direct
Corporation Beta toward achieving the desired R&M for this engine program. These
elements were engine power usage definition, new mission-oriented endurance test,
simulated mission endurance test, accelerated service test, reliability tracking,
maintainability demonstrations, award fees for reliability and maintainability, and in-
flight engine condition monitoring system. Several of these elements are discussed in
section 3.4 of the thesis; however, the following section will expound upon those
elements that required a clear understanding of the program's goal on the US Navy's side
of the development program. The continued sections will further explore other processes
and tools implemented by the US Navy to allow for a more reliable, maintainable, and
sustainable ZM10 engine system.
4.3.1 Elements of the "New Look" Program
The first of these elements in the "New Look" program was the engine power
usage definition. This was done very early in the engine program and was established for
nine specific missions. These missions were analyzed in order to determine engine-
operating severity for component design, which was to be conducted later in the
development phase. This actual engine power usage was used to assess proper engine
parts' life times in a real life environment.
Another new feature for this engine program was the implementation of an
incentives program. This program would grant monetary awards to Corporation Beta
upon the successful demonstration of the engine system's R&M characteristics. These
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requirements were measured reliability during SMET, measured R&M during AST, and
measured reliability in the F/A- 18 aircraft. The US Navy awarded the engine developers
a total of eight million dollars for meeting these requirements.
The in-flight engine condition monitoring system was another requirement of the
US Navy. This was an integrated aircraft-engine system for determining engine health
and life usage. The system incorporated engine sensors to monitor specific parts of the
engine system. This system also provides take-off thrust check, detects exceedances,
provides cockpit cautions, counts and records life used indices, displays maintenance
codes, and provides incident recordings. The data collected from this system is then
retrieved and then processed by the US Navy at a ground station for service operations.
4.3.2 Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM)
RCM is a process the US Navy has been using since the deployment of the first
ZM10 engine system. This process seeks to determine the engine system's maintenance
and replacement of parts schedules through careful statistical analyses and performance
data collected from endurance tests conducted during development and from currently
operational systems within the US Navy. This method attempts to forecast parts
requirements for the engine system and predict the maintenance tasks for replacement.
4.3.3 Tooling Information Management System (TIMS)
Due to the shutdown of production of the Hornet aircraft, the US Navy enacted
programs for continued support of the ZM10 engine systems. One of these programs is
TIMS. This program maintains a storage database of tools and part drawings for the
ZM10 engine system. TIMS is based on a part-to-tool relationship, and the outcome is a
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recommendation to retain or scrap the tool based on future needs for the part that
particular tool is to manufacture.
The normal procedure of accounting for government owned tools is as follows.
When a tool is not being used anymore, the contractor inventories the details of the tool.
This provides the government with information particular to the tool and requests
disposition instructions. All of this requires moving the tool several times before the
disposition instructions are provided. With the TIMS database, once the US Navy
determines which tools are not going to be used anymore in production, they run the list
through the system. TIMS output will give a disposition recommendation on whether to
scrap or retain the tools.
TIMS is widely thought of as a good program that will save the US military
millions of dollars over the next two decades. Current planning is for the F/A-1 8A/B
models to be operational and maintained until 2015 and the F/A-i 8C/D models until
2020. Retaining the correct tools for future spare requirements keeps the government
from building these same tools again. TIMS is a part of the US Navy's on-going, post-
production planning process. Other programs are now in the works to further other post-
production requirements such as maintenance and software development capabilities.
4.3.4 Maintenix System
In 1999, the US Navy took advantage of a new software system designed to
support the operation and maintenance management of fleets of aircraft assets called the
Maintenix System. By using Intemet/Intranet technology, Maintenix brings fleet data
from distributed databases back to a central database, which allows fleet level forecasting
of upcoming spare parts and resource demands. Maintenix serves as the maintenance
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information management system for 1,273 engines in the US military (including the
ZM10 engine systems). This system has brought the US Navy unprecedented capabilities
for fleet configuration and status monitoring. It has been praised throughout all levels of
the ZM10 engine program from making fleet management duties easier to promoting a
new level of readiness for the engine system.
4.4 Practices
The US Navy uses several practices for the ZM1 0 engine programs to ensure
RM&S issues are steadily acknowledged. These practices, which will be explained in
detail in the sections below, are IPTs, ZM10/ZM1 5 Key Supplier Symposiums, the
ZM10 Fleet Leader Program, and ZM10 Engine IPT/Field Support Team
(FST)/Corporation Beta - Maintenance Awareness Briefs.
4.4.1 Integrated Product Teams (IPTs)
Although the US Navy incorporates IPTs into its overall plan for sustainment,
the idea of an IPT is a fairly new concept. IPTs became very popular in the late 1980s
and early 1990s. The purpose of the IPT is to ensure that RM&S issues are accounted for
throughout the entire life cycle of the system. The team consists of a group of technically
experienced individuals from a variety of backgrounds that are well informed of the
customer's needs and the system's characteristics.
The IPT for the propulsion system for the F/A- 18 aircraft is ran by the Propulsion
System Program Office of NAVAIR. The team uses lessons learned from past engine
programs and innovative methods and technologies from the commercial industry to
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resolve problems for the aging ZM10 engine systems. Since its conception, the ZM10
IPT has been responsible for 47 major actions to help improve the ZM10 engine system.
4.4.2 ZMJO/ZMJ5 Key Supplier Symposiums
The semi-annual Key Supplier Symposium is a practice the US Navy uses to
confront sustainability issues of the ZM1O/ZM15 engine systems. This event, which has
been actively held since 1991, is a forum for government and industry representatives to
improve RM&S issues for the engine systems through open dialogue and collaborative
efforts. The attendees include several governmental agencies involved with the
sustainment of these systems (i.e. NAVAIR, the ZM10 FST, Depots, Defense Logistics
Agency, etc.), contributing subcontractors/vendors, and Corporation Beta.
The forum is combined with notable speakers on relevant topics, sustainability
workshops, and problem-solving presentations. Several good ideas have stemmed from
these presentations and have been incorporated in these engine programs today. For
example, to improve supportability issues, a team developed a CD-ROM based
interactive software. This software verifies that certain manufacturing processes meet all
quality requirements. The tool is utilized to review past quality problems and currently,
has been found to be effective in ensuring product quality.
The symposium addresses many current and arising problems with the
ZM1O/ZM15 engine programs by analyzing past engine problems. This practice is
important to sustainability because the ZM10 engine is an aging system. This event
allows the collaboration of everyone to encounter inevitable issues from spare parts
procurement to the revising of procedures and processes to reduce lead-times. This
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forum has become a popular event to ensure that the US Navy's F/A- 18 aircraft fulfills it
readiness requirement.
4.4.3 ZMJ 0 Fleet Leader Program
The ZM10 Fleet Leader Program has been identifying the ZM10 engine systems
support issues since 1983. This program offers both technical support and cost savings
methods based on actual hardware experience. This is done by collecting data on the
most readily available ZM10 engine systems, modules, and components.
One of the ways this data is collected is from analytical condition inspections
(ACI). ACIs acquire the condition/health of the engine system's components with the
highest numbers of operational hours. The first objective is identifying the components
reliability growth or decline. The second objective is to critique organizational and depot
inspection criteria. These objectives validate safety and logistical trends while ensuring
ZM10 mechanics are in sync with the changing conditions of the engine's maintenance
scheme. This program allows specific inspection requirements to be loaded into the
manuals before the rest of the fleet parts population reaches these operating times.
Flight-line technicians can then know exactly what to look for or what to observe during
inspections.
The program directly supports the new US Navy's engine philosophy of growing
parts lives based on actual performance. The Fleet Leader Program equips managers,
engineers, mechanics, technicians, and logisticians with information and lead times to
respond to potential impacts to the majority of engine systems. The program contributes
to affordable ZM10 readiness.
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4.4.4 ZMJ0 Engine IPT/ Field Support Team (FST) / Corporation Beta - Maintenance
Awareness Briefs
Once a year, IPTs, the FST, along with Corporation Beta deliver maintenance
awareness briefs to the ZM10 organizational and maintenance communities. The primary
purpose of these briefs is to communicate recent changes that could affect readiness, and
to describe maintenance critical areas that could lead to significant failures if not properly
maintained. This information also defines excessive maintenance, thereby eliminating
the consumption of unjustified maintenance man-hours, material, and costs.
Maintenance awareness briefs are divided into four parts. The first part begins
with an overview of the support and allocated resources for the ZM10 engine. The
second part reviews the status of preventive maintenance changes and maintenance
advisories with respect to each module. The third part of the brief addresses those areas
that should be closely scrutinized while maintaining the engine, identifying maintenance
critical areas that could lead to significant failures. The final part of the brief allows an
interaction between the team and mechanics to improve maintenance of the ZM10 engine
system.
The underlying theme of these briefs is to reduce unnecessary engine removals by
utilizing established technical manuals and to promote better maintenance by identifying
improper maintenance practices and correcting them accordingly. The information
provided during these briefs aids the fleet to recognize maintenance changes already
incorporated and to anticipate changes prior to deployment. They also provide an open
arena for discussion and resolution of problem identification.
4.5 Results
Overall, the US Navy has been genuinely pleased with the R&M characteristics
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of the ZM1O engine systems. In 1985, during a congressional hearing, former Secretary
of the Navy, John Lehman, expressed that the ZM10-1 engine system was the best fighter
engine in the world developed at that time. Although the US Navy decided to implement
a second source program with Corporation Alpha, it was not because they were
dissatisfied with the engines. The ZM1O engine system would become the backbone of
the US Navy's fighting force, and they needed to generate an alternate plan in the case
that Corporation Beta proved to be an unreliable resource during crucial military times.
The US Navy has conveyed its satisfaction with Corporation Beta's efforts in
producing a more reliable, maintainable, and sustainable engine system. This is observed
through the US Navy's continued involvement with the organization. The US Navy has
awarded over a billion dollars to the company for upgrade kits, component module
improvements and replacements, and the procurement of the ZM1 5 engine system for the
Super Hornet aircraft.
They have also been pleased with the dedication Corporation Beta has exhibited
for these engine systems. For example, the organization has sponsored several courses
for maintenance familiarization for the US Navy to aid mechanics, technicians, and
managers to meet readiness requirements. Corporation Beta has also been highly active
in the US Navy's IPTs and their FST to help resolve future problems encountered with
the engine systems.
To date, the biggest problem faced in the ZM10 engine systems is the issue of
parts lives. Several parts have experienced rapid failure rates then originally quoted by
Corporation Beta and other subcontractors/vendors. The US Navy felt that if better
processes and tools were implemented to accurately predict and forecast parts lives and
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replacements, then the current problem they are facing would not exist. However, since
the US Navy explicitly expressed R&M concerns from the initial phases of these engine
programs, they have been very pleased with the engines overall R&M characteristics.
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Chapter 5: Research and Data Analysis
The previous chapters investigated the efforts the US Navy and Corporation Beta
incorporated to improve the R&M of the ZM10 engine systems. This chapter will
analyze the data collected on policies, technologies, processes and tools, and practices as
well as the data collected from the NAVAIR in Patuxent River, Maryland.
5.1 Research Analysis
The idea of sustainment is a relatively new concept that originated in the early
1980s. The sustainment of aging weapon systems was Secretary of Defense
Weinberger's solution to modernizing the US military. Prior to this sustainment
movement, there was only one requirement of a military jet fighter aircraft engine:
performance. The US Navy, as well as the other departments of the US armed forces,
believed that successfully meeting this requirement was the key to defeating potential
enemies. However, as the engine system accumulated more flight hours and the O&M
costs surpassed allotted funds, the US Navy decided to change its major focus of the
engine.
As a result, programs were established to solve readiness and total ownership cost
concerns through the incorporation of R&M features to the ZMIO engine systems. These
programs would trade R&M issues against performance issues in order to develop a
durable, cheaper engine system for the F/A- 18 aircraft. They would also set the pace for
future enacted policies, technologies, processes and tools, and practices for the ZM1O
engine program to be transformed into a more sustainable system.
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5.1.1 Policy Analysis
From the beginning of the ZM10 engine program, the US Navy had some
knowledge of the definition of sustainability. As I have shown throughout chapters three
and four, they incorporated the lessons learned from past US military engine programs to
develop an engine system where life-cycle support costs was the motivating factor.
These costs, which also include O&M, reflect the total ownership cost of the engine. The
US Navy understood that by addressing R&M issues from the initial phases of
development they would simultaneously address some issues concerning sustainability.
This was observed through the US Navy's "New Look" program, where R&M
ranked higher in importance and priority then the overall performance levels of the
engine, and Corporation Beta's "Design-to-Cost" method, which would use cost as the
main tracking variable for the development of the engine systems. Together these two
programs would alter the manner in which engine programs would be designed. Future
engine programs would indeed look for the balance between R&M and performance as
accomplished in the ZM10 engine programs. This was a major step in defense policy and
after thirty years of uncovering this point, the US government would finally include
sustainment as a requirement in all of its weapon system acquisition programs.
Throughout my research, I have come across one unsettling fact about policy-
making and implementation in the US government. It is a slow process. In the 1970s,
the US Navy and Corporation Beta revealed the principles of sustainability by developing
an engine system that would (1) be reliable and easily maintainable and (2) reducing the
total cost of ownership of the system. In the early 1980s, Casper W. Weinberger stated
that the sustainment of weapon systems was the key to reducing life-cycle support costs
and modernizing the US military. Yet, it would take until 2001 for the DoD to include
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sustainment policy as a part of its official defense acquisition policy. The policy-making
and implementation of the US government must be quick enough to respond to future
problems the US military could experience in the years to come to avoid the problems
encountered in past weapon system programs resulting from a lack of sustainment policy.
The US military has made several changes to prevent high operating and
supporting costs for future weapon systems through its defense acquisition reform
program. This reform seeks to make the past list of policies more concise and adaptive to
the current set of problems faced by the US military and includes new ideas to combat
sustainment issues in the future. One such idea is the CAIV method, which seeks to
make the costs of the weapon system program, both present and future, an important
military requirement. Another is the freedom of the PM to make important decisions
about sustainability related concerns in the acquisition process to attain a cheaper cost of
the weapon system without the approval of higher management. Finally, a clear
definition of sustainment policy has been established for all weapon systems both
operational and forthcoming in the US military from the concept phase to disposal.
These changes and many like them will aid in the creation of more reliable, maintainable,
and sustainable weapon systems, including engine systems, in the new millennium.
5.1.2 Technology Analysis
The two most important technologies incorporated into the ZM10 engine
programs were the modular concept and the borescope technology. Modularity would
allow the US Navy to achieve exceptional R&M performance from the engine systems.
As a result, the US Navy was able to reduce the total ownership cost of the engine
system. The borescope technology would allow the flight-line technician to locate engine
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problems without complicated performance tests and in a relatively short period of time.
Both of these technologies would reduce the overall support costs of the engine programs
and the required time taken to perform maintenance tasks for the engine systems.
The DoD 5000 Series lists the requirements of the technology considered for all
US military acquisition programs. The two most significant requirements are technology
demonstrations and technology maturation. The ZM1O engine programs achieved both of
these requirements. Through such processes and tools like maintainability
demonstrations, endurance tests, and reliability tracking, the US Navy was able to
conclude that the technology Corporation Beta used for these engine programs met the
initial engine program's objectives and goals. These requirements were essential for the
US Navy's R&M concerns and would allow for the reduction of UERs, maintenance
man-hours, and total ownership costs. These requirements would also play an integral
role in defining sustainment technology requirements for future weapon systems.
5.1.3 Processes and Tools Analysis
The US Navy and Corporation Beta approached this engine program quite
differently than those conducted prior to the ZM1O engine. Because of the new R&M
concerns of the US Navy, new processes and tools were incorporated into the ZM10
engine systems to resolve such issues. Through the US Navy's "New Look" program
and Corporation Beta's Bottom Line Measures, several new programs were introduced to
ensure that R&M would be one of the major factors throughout every step of
development. These two programs accomplished this task.
The "New Look" program required Corporation Beta to add new processes and
tools to guarantee that R&M characteristics were the central focus of the engine
82
programs. New endurance tests were created in order to test the reliability of the system,
and older tests were altered to create a more realistic testing environment for the engine.
In the end, these tests would generate sufficient data to show the actual performance of
the engine systems in a real-flight mission, and they would alert the US Navy of the
potential problems/failures that would occur in the engine system after several accrued
flight-hours.
The most significant and innovative processes used during these engine programs
were the maintainability demonstrations, reliability tracking, and the incentives programs.
These demonstrations, which became a requirement of all US military engine programs,
ensured that the engine could be serviced in a timely-fashion by mechanics and flight-line
technicians. Reliability tracking would track all problems/failures that occurred during
the development of the engine systems. This was done so that the US Navy would know
what to expect from the engine system under certain flying conditions. This was also
done so that severe problems/failures would be repaired before the development process
continued. The most noteworthy of the processes was the incentives program. This
program granted monetary awards to Corporation Beta for demonstrating R&M
characteristics of the engine systems and included a penalty clause if these characteristics
were unsuccessfully exhibited by specified deadlines. This program provided
Corporation Beta the motivation to address these issues in the engine programs.
One important tool used during these engine programs was the two-dimensional
computer-drafting tool. This was the first engine program Corporation Beta used
computer designed engine parts. It was very successful in ensuring precision amongst all
engine parts. However, mockups were still needed to show how the whole engine fit
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together and to demonstrate maintainability features. The ZM15 engine system became
the first engine program that used three-dimensional modeling for parts design.
As the ZM10 engine family matured and the US military began to realize and
understand the importance of sustainability, the US Navy generated such processes and
tools to support the aging engine systems. One such tool for these engine systems was
the Maintenix System. This system organized all the ZM10 engine modules/parts into
one database to forecast upcoming spare parts and resource demands. This tool and
others like them would further ensure that the US Navy would be prepared to manage any
engine problems centered around the RM&S concerns of the engine system.
Although the Maintenix System was not implemented until 1999, it is important
to note that the implementation of this program and others like it is a sign that the US
Navy began to grasp the entailments of sustainment. The US Navy did not require
Corporation Beta to resolve sustainability issues at the beginning of the engine program.
There focus on R&M, however, was a beginning. If these characteristics were ignored
during the initial development phase, the US Navy would have encountered a much more
complex quagmire as the systems began to mature. Instead, the US Navy was able to
make the necessary modifications in their ZM10 engine programs with the addition of
new processes and tools and practices, which would allow for a more sustainable engine
system for the F/A- 18 aircraft.
5.1.4 Practices Analysis
Several practices were implemented by Corporation Beta to ensure R&M
characteristics were being addressed (the reliability program) and the total ownership
costs of the engine system remained low (the "Design-to-Cost" method). The primary
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objectives of the reliability program were to identify potential problems/failures early in
the development phase, measure the engine program's progress to fulfilling the R&M
requirements stated by the US Navy, and recommend the appropriate corrective actions
where needed in the engine programs. This program created a list of assessment tasks to
ensure that reliability was covered during every phase of development. It also provided
essential data/information for future incurred problems with the engine system as well as
solutions before they happened.
The "Design-to-Cost" method was a way to reduce the total life-cycle costs of the
ZM10 engine systems from the initial phases of the design process. This practice called
for Corporation Beta to use program cost as the motivating factor of the engine program.
This concept is very similar to the CAIV process that was adapted into defense policy in
the late 1990s. Both concepts rely on tradeoffs between performance and cost as a mean
to develop the most reliable and cheapest engine system feasible. The CAIV method is
built on the foundation of the "Design-to-Cost" method; therefore, it is safe to conclude
that through Corporation Beta's "Design-to-Cost" method, the US Navy learned a
valuable lesson in how to conduct its engine programs. This lesson was that the cost
variable should to be introduced in the earliest possible stages of the design process in
order to develop a cheaper engine system.
As the engine system matured and sustainment principles became more prevalent
in the military culture, the US Navy adapted several new practices into its ZM10 engine
programs. They were IPTs, ZM1O/ZM15 Key Supplier Symposiums, the ZM10 Fleet
Leader Program, and ZM10 Engine IPT/FST/Corporation Beta - Maintenance Awareness
Briefs IPTs. Before the implementation of these practices the ZM10 System Program
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Office was responsible for all the RM&S concerns of the engine system. However, as
time progressed, the US Navy realized that more needed to be done in order to maintain
the engine system in an operational status. All of the above mentioned practices address
RM&S issues of the engine programs. These practices have been very successful in
resolving a wide range of RM&S problems for the US Navy and making sure that these
engine systems met the readiness requirement of the US military.
5.2 Data Analysis
In order to quantitatively analyze the ZM10 family of engines, it was essential to
collect the necessary performance metrics for the engine systems. The US Navy collects
several metrics to evaluate the RM&S of their engine systems. From the prior LSI
research and to military availability, the UER and SER metrics were used for this
analysis. The UER metric refers to removing the engine system from the aircraft for
reasons other than regularly scheduled maintenance, while the SER metric concentrates
on removing the engine system from the aircraft for regularly scheduled maintenance.
An engine removal signals when a flight-line technician cannot repair the associated
engine problem while housed in the aircraft. Upon its removal, it is sent to the depot for
maintenance where the previously encountered problem can be fixed. The US Navy must
then utilize its funds to pay for the maintenance services provided by the depot, which
further adds to the life-cycle support cost of the engine program. Although the engine
removal indicates some level of maintenance, not all engine problems require removing
the entire engine. Another major consideration for selecting the UER metric for analysis
of RM&S performance was because it also monitors when the engine was not functioning
properly in the aircraft.
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NAVAIR in Patuxent River, Maryland provided the data for these metrics. The
personnel at the site were contacted after a thorough Internet search was conducted and
uncovered the name of a contract specialist who works on the ZM10 engine programs.
After several emails and phone conversations, the individual directed me to the F/A- 18
Propulsion Team Leader who eventually delivered this data via email.
Unfortunately, due to a lack of interest and manpower of the F/A- 18 Propulsion
Team, I was unable to visit the facility at Patuxent River, Maryland, interview the
contacts, and consult the contacts on questions about the data. It is important to note that
I continued a strong effort to locating other possible contacts within the US Navy;
however, after the tragic events of September 11, 2001, this became practically
impossible due to the US military's heightened security measures. I did seek out the
consultation of my Corporation Beta contacts. However, they could not explain the
behavior of the engine removal plots. Therefore, the conclusions made about the data are
based on my literature searches and hypothesized interpretations of the data.
5.2.1 ZM10-1 Engine RM&S Metrics
Figure 5.2.1.1 illustrates the UER and SER/1 000 Effective Flight Hours for the
ZM10-1 engine system as a function of month and fiscal year ranging from January 1996
to May 2001. Theoretically, the ideal pattern of the UER/1000 EFH should decrease over
time (Figure 5.2.1.2). This is primarily is due to the fact that the maintainers of the
engine system are not very familiar with the characteristics of the
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engine systems allowing them to predict an appropriate maintenance schedule as well as
the time an engine should be removed from the aircraft to be properly serviced.
However, as time progresses and the maintainers of the engines have a better idea of
when to expect these failure modes, these metric values should converge to some
constant value based on the specifications of the particular engine system.
FIGURE 5.2.1.2: IDEAL UER/1000EFH REPRESENTATION
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The data provided by the ZM10 Propulsion & Power Team in Patuxent River,
Maryland represents a snap shot of the life of the ZM10-1 engine system and examines
what appears to be the convergent part of its lifetime. Since the notion of theoretical is
nonexistent in a real-life environment, the fluctuations observed in Figure 5.2.1.1 are a
result of the noise in the system, i.e. wars or regional conflicts, demand issues,
maintenance errors, etc, all can affect the UERs and SERs of the engine system. From a
first glance, one can immediately notice the anomaly in the SER data between the dates
of September 1998 to November 1998. Since the patterns of both the UER and SER
metrics are very consistent, questions must be posed on the reason(s) why this peak exist.
Through several literature and Internet searches, I discovered the reason. In 1998,
the ZM10 IPT met to take action to reduce the life limit of defective ZM10-1 engine parts
manufactured by a second source vendor. This life limit reduction applied to a specific
population of high-pressure turbine forward cooling plates (FCPs). The ZM10 IPT took
immediate action in order to reduce the risk of a FCP failure in the fleet. A FCP failure
during flight typically results in an uncontained engine failure that causes significant
damage to the engine and the airframe. The damage creates a dangerous flight situation
that has the potential result of loss of an aircraft and crew.
This problem was first noticed in 1996. At that time, the ZM10 IPT released a
power plant bulletin to reduce the life limit of one population of FCPs from 1600
Equivalent Low Cycle Fatigue (ELCF) Cycles (approximately 1550 engine flight hours)
to 1300 ELCF due to dimensional discrepancies discovered during an inspection of one
of the FCPs. In September 1998, the IPT reduced the life limit of the same population of
FCPs affected by the 1996 bulletin from 1300 ELCF to 650 ELCF. This life limit
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reduction immediately grounded 130 engines. This was a result of two uncontained
engine failures attributed to a newly set of identified defects in the FCPs. These defects,
which were different from the previous encountered problems with the FCPs in 1996,
consisted of a variety of problems caused by an inconsistent machining process.
With the help of the ZM10 FST and Corporation Beta, a life and risk analysis was
completed on the defective parts. This analysis took into account the life calculation as
well as the age distribution of the active parts in the engine system. Corporation Beta
determined that a life limit reduction to 650 ELCF was required to reduce the risk of an
additional failure to an acceptable level. The life reduction had a serious impact on
engine readiness. Due to the sudden engine removals, the supply system could not keep
up with the demand for spare engines. Bare firewalls, an aircraft with only one of its
engines installed, increased from 100 to 180 ELCF. Although the life limit reductions
resulted in significant engine readiness problems, the actions were necessary to prevent
additional failures. Since then, the FCP has been redesigned and has a life limit of 3900
ELCF, almost two times the original life limit.
The ZM10-1 UER metric average is approximately 1.59 unscheduled engine
removals/1000 EFH while the SER metric average is 2.76 scheduled engine
removals/1 000 EFH for this data. A polynomial fit and Fourier series analysis were
conducted on this set of d4g4; however, the analysis showed no significant patterns worth
noting in this thesis.
5.2.2 ZM1 0-2 Engine RM&S Metrics
Figure 5.2.2.1 represents a snap shot of the life of the ZM10-2 engine system and
examines what appears to be the convergent part of its lifetime. It also illustrates the
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UERs and the SERs for the ZM10-2 engine system. As one can observe, both of the
metrics have the same general pattern during this time frame from April 1996 to May
2001. At the end of the plot, the metrics begin to increase.
FIGURE 5.2.2.1: ZM10-2 ENGINE REMOVALS
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Several hypothesized reasons can be stated for the observed behavior at the tail
end of this plot. However, I have concluded that there can only a few justifiable reasons.
Because of the manner in which both the UER and SER metrics rapidly rise in a similar
fashion, I deduced that the US Navy was indeed aware that a problem(s) was
forthcoming. If this were not the case, then the UER metric would be noticeably higher
than or much closer to the SER metric. This does not appear to be the case, which further
leads me to believe that the US Navy was indeed prepared for this situation. However,
the issue still remains that if the US Navy was aware of an approaching problem, then
why does the UER metric steadily rise with the SER metric.
This could be for several different reasons. However, I believe it is because there
was an unavoidable problem or issue embodied within the engine system, and the US
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Navy could not respond to all of the needs of the ZM10-2 engine system population in
time to keep the unscheduled removal rate down. For example, the F/A- 18 Hornet
aircraft could have been involved in some peace keeping measures by the US Navy. In
this event, the engine system would have accumulated more flight hours than originally
intended. Therefore, the US Navy would need to swiftly perform more maintenance
tasks on the system before more problems were incurred. Another possibility is a spare
parts issue. If the US Navy was aware of a demand issue with spare parts, they would
indeed increase the number of SER performed during this time frame. Compounded with
the rapid approach of the lifetime of a part (which would lead to a replacement), the UER
metric would have rapidly risen as well. Both of these scenarios suggest a reason why
the UER and SER metrics rise so rapidly at the end of this plot. Unfortunately, without
the aid of an experienced individual involved with this engine program, I can only
speculate the reasons.
The ZM10-2 UER metric average is approximately 1.73 unscheduled engine
removals/1 000 EFH over the this time frame, slightly higher than the average value
calculated for the ZM10-1 engine system, while the SER metric average is 2.44
scheduled engine removals/1000 EFH for this data. A polynomial fit and Fourier series
analysis were also conducted on this set of data; however, the analysis showed no
significant patterns worth noting in this thesis.
5.3 Comparative Analysis
Figure 5.3.1 illustrates a comparison between both of the engine system's UER
metrics. Overall the ZM10-1 engine system seems to be a better engine system. As one
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can observe, the ZM10-2 engine system's UER metric is slightly higher than the ZM10-1
engine system, which is unexpected. The overarching goal of a derivative engine system
is to achieve better performance measures than its predecessor, especially the UER
metric.
I was unable to consult the US Navy on why this was the case. I could only
speculate on the possible reasons. One reason could be due to a parts problem in the
ZM10-2 engine system. The ZM10-2 engine system entered the US Navy ten years after
the ZM10-1 engine system. Therefore, there could have problems experienced with a
faulty part similar to the FCP situation encountered in the ZM10-1 engine system in
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1998. Over time the US Navy would have corrected the problem and the UER metric
would have decreased to a lower value than the ZM10-1 engine's UER metric.
Another possible reason could be the incorrect comparison of these two engines
over this specified time frame. The ZM10-2 engine system entered the US Navy in 1991
approximately 10 years after the ZM10-1 engine system became operational. Therefore,
to make an accurate comparison of these two engine systems, it might be incorrect to use
the same data over a specific time frame (i.e. comparing both engine systems from 1995
to 2000), yet it might require using the same data corresponding to the actual engine
usage. For example, if the data for the ZM10-l engine system between 1986 to 1991 was
compared to the data obtained for the ZM10-2 engine system from 1996 to 2001, then it
could be quite possible that a more precise conclusion could be drawn about which
engine system is the superior engine system.
The ZM10-2 engine system has not acquired as many flight hours as the ZM10-1
engine; therefore, the maintainers of the engine system are not as familiar with all the
characteristics of the engine as they are with the ZM10-1 engine. Unforeseen problems
could still exist in the ZM10-2 engine system. Since the UER metric for the ZM10-2
engine system is only a few hundredths above the ZM10-1 engine system, then one might
conclude that it is an overall better engine system. One might even deduce that after 20
years of being operational, the ZM10-1 engine system should have a lower UER metric
than the ZM10-2 engine system. Without the council of the members of either of these
engine programs, one cannot determine.
Figure 5.3.2 illustrates the comparison between the SER metrics of the ZM10-1
and ZM10-2 engine systems. The SER rate for the ZM10-2 engine system appears to be
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slightly lower than the ZM10-1 engine system (ignoring the anomaly for the ZM10-1
engine in late 1998). One can draw a conclusion that since the ZM10-2 engine system is
FIGuRE 5.3.2: SERS/1000EFH Vs. TIME (MONTH-YEAR)
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a derivative of the ZM10-1, certain problems/failures that occurred in the ZM10-1 could
have been previously accounted for in the ZM10-2 engine system and/or maintenance
schedule through the lessons learned from the ZM10-1 engine system, the maintainers of
the ZM1 0-2 engine system could have accurately predicted when to anticipate specific
problems, and they could have generated a proper scheduled maintenance plan to avoid
these issues before they become problematic.
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Unfortunately, I can only speculate on the reasons why the data behaves in this
particular manner. The data does not specify the total number of EFH flown by the F/A-
18 fleet or the EFH flown per month. The data also does not designate whether or not
these engine systems were used on land or on-board aircraft carriers. This data neglects
to show the complete life of the engine systems from initial deployment into the US
Navy. Without the consultation of the ZM10 engine family managers, nothing more can
be determined from this data.
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Chapter 6: Conclusions and Recommendations
The previous chapters documented the investigations and data analyses used to
determine the impact of the early design of RM&S into the engine system had on the
overall engine system's performance. As a result, this research has produced a number of
conclusions. This chapter will state these conclusions and recommend further research
paths that may improve the understanding of designing for RM&S.
6.1 Conclusions
Based on the data that was collected and analyzed, I have concluded that the
thesis hypothesis is undetermined. I feel there are still several unanswered questions and
issues that must be addressed before a firm conclusion can be established. The data
provided by NAVAIR in Patuxent River, Maryland is ambiguous without the assistance
of a member (or members) of the ZM10 family program to expound upon the collected
data.
The lack of US Navy cooperation was the main factor that led me to the
undetermined conclusion of my thesis hypothesis. I was unable to interview US Navy
officials who are (or were) directly related to the ZM1 0 engine family and visit the actual
facilities where the engine systems are serviced and maintained. This imposed a problem
from the initial stages of my research. Without the consultation of these members and a
more detailed knowledge of how these engine programs are managed, I felt a definite
conclusion could not be formulated. As a result, I had no way to prove or disprove the
main theories I generated for the data, which were derived throughout my research
investigation and are repeatedly mentioned in Chapter V of the thesis.
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Another reason a firm conclusion cannot be made from this data is due to the
specified dates of the data. The ZM10-1 engine entered into service in 1981. This engine
was operational for approximately twenty years when these plots were generated for this
system. The ZM1O-2 engine was only operational for approximately nine years at the
time these plots were generated. To make an accurate conclusion on which engine
system is better, I would need to compare these engine systems performance measures
over the same operational years not fiscal years.
I can only speculate on which engine system demonstrates the best sustainability
performance. The ZM10-2 engine has approximately the same number of UERs
(rounded to the nearest whole number) as its predecessor after only being operational for
nine years. I could conclude that the ZM1 0-2 engine is indeed a more sustainable engine
system because in half the operational time of the ZM10-1 engine it has nearly the same
performance measures. Referring to Figure 5.2.1.2, as time progresses, the number of
UERs should indeed decrease. However, this conclusion would be immature. I would
have no way of knowing whether or not the ZM10-2 engine system met its convergent
value more rapidly then the ZM10-1 engine. Therefore, the data needed should range
from the fiscal year it entered into service to present day so a firm conclusion can be
offered on which engine system demonstrates the best sustainability performance.
Another conclusion formed from my thesis research is that the US Navy and
Corporation Beta partially understood the importance of sustainability in the development
of these engine systems. The US Navy's objectives for these engine programs were that
both R&M and cost were addressed in the initial phases of the programs. Such programs
as "Design-to-Cost" and the reliability program are proof that Corporation Beta was
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dedicated and devoted to producing an engine system where R&M characteristics were
improved and the total cost of ownership would be significantly less than previous
engines. The US Navy was indeed aware that an early concentration on R&M issues
would eventually lead to a more sustainable engine system even during the time of pre-
sustainment ideas.
The ZM10 family was the first sustainable jet fighter aircraft engine systems in
the US Navy. This was primarily due to the adaptation of new policies, technologies,
processes and tools, and practices implemented throughout the lifetime of the systems.
These engine systems are still lauded today by the military because of there exceptional
RM&S characteristics.
6.2 Recommendations on Continued Research
The lack of a firm conclusion for this thesis leaves questioned to be answered to
provide an in-depth understanding of designing for RM&S in military jet fighter aircraft
engines. The first suggestion is locating a cooperative point of contact within the US
Navy who is involved with the ZM10 engine systems. This point of contact should be
willing to access the data over the lifetime of these engine systems so an accurate
analysis can be conducted. They should also be eager to provide a facility tour of the
place where the engines are serviced and maintained to gain a better understanding of the
repair and maintenance processes. Finally, they should be enthusiastic in assisting with
any questions on the data and/or questions about the ZM10 engine systems.
Another research suggestion is a comparison of this research on Corporation Beta
to the prior LSI research on Corporation Alpha. Of course, this would follow the
successful understanding of the ZM10 engine systems. This study could also include the
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examination of the ZMl 5 engine system in quite a similar fashion as the prior LSI
research. This comparison study should determine which engine manufacturer is better
suited to develop engine systems for the US military.
Finally, the last recommendation would be to study the sustainment features of
another aerospace system. Throughout my research study, I uncovered several
encountered problems with avionic packages and landing gear for US military aircraft.
For example, the landing gear for the F/A- 18 aircraft happens to be the second major
problem concerning aircraft readiness for the US Navy. Examining vendor/subcontractor
relationships with the US Navy could also be another avenue to explore to develop a
broader understanding of sustainment.
6.3 Concluding Remarks
This thesis does not answer all the questions concerned with designing RM&S
for military jet fighter aircraft engines. However, it has offered some detailed
information to addressing the issue. As more research is conducted on this topic, a more
profound understanding can and will be developed. I would have to agree with the prior
LSI researcher when he stated that designing for sustainability involves many more
factors than just sustainment. Further focused research on the subject of sustainment
should provide the US military and the aerospace industry with more detailed information
on how to address the essential needs of the warfighter and how to reduce support cost of
an aircraft engine as well as other aerospace systems.
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